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ABSTRACT 
The Food and Drug Administration’s citizen petition process was created in the 
1970s as part of an effort to fashion more participatory regimes, and was intended as 
a mechanism for ordinary citizens to raise concerns about food, drugs, and FDA 
regulations. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the citizen petition process 
may have taken a different turn. This empirical study explores whether 
pharmaceutical companies are systematically using citizen petitions to try to delay the 
approval of generic competitors. Delaying generic entry of a drug—even by a few 
months—can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars of additional revenue, a cost 
ultimately borne by consumers and government agencies in the form of high drug 
prices. 
This Article provides empirical evidence that the citizen petition process at the 
FDA has now become a key avenue for strategic behavior by pharmaceutical 
companies to delay entry of generic competition. It is a far cry from the “participatory 
citizen” notion that fueled the creation of such avenues at regulatory agencies. Not 
only has the number of citizen petitions with the potential to delay generic entry 
dramatically increased over the past decade, but the timing of citizen petitions 
indicates that they are being filed late in the game as a last-ditch effort to hold off 
competition. Congressional reforms enacted in 2007 aimed to stem the tide of citizen 
petition abuse, but our analysis of the data indicates that those reforms have not 
succeeded in doing so. This Article concludes by examining the nature of the problem 
and exploring the feasibility of three types of approaches to curb the behavior. These 
include: 1) a simple prohibition, if one were to conclude that most behavior in the 
category is likely to be inappropriate; 2) procedural blocks to ensure that the behavior 
cannot create suboptimal results; or 3) punitive measures as a deterrent. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
For thirty years, the Hatch-Waxman system for expediting approval of generic 
drugs has brought increased competition to the market and lower drug prices to 
consumers of all income levels. The generic approval system has enjoyed 
extraordinary success. Today, more than 80% of prescriptions are filled with 
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generics,1 and most generics are eventually priced at a discount that is  
80-85% below their brand-name equivalents.2 Despite this success, anecdotal 
evidence has percolated in recent years about new forms of strategic behavior 
designed to keep drug prices artificially inflated by blocking generic entry.3 
In particular, public outcry over the rising price of pharmaceuticals has led to 
highly publicized congressional hearings, high profile press articles, and outrage 
from various presidential candidates on the topic. These public forays reveal 
examples of disturbing behaviors in various corners of the pharmaceutical industry. 
For example, the nation was riveted when the Turing CEO Martin Shkreli 
appeared before Congress regarding his company’s elevation of a drug price from 
$13.50 a tablet to $750 a tablet, a price hike apparently protected by efforts to block 
out generic competitors.4 In a similar vein, federal prosecutors have initiated a 
fraud action against the pharmaceutical company Valeant for tactics related to 
specialty pharmacies and price increases.5 
 
 1.   See Implementation of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA): 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1 & chart 1 (2016) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, 
FDA), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm485057.htm [http://perma.cc/XRP7-
D4P6]; see also IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SHIFTING COSTS OF 
HEALTHCARE: A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2013 51 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.imshealth.com/en/thought-leadership/ims-institute/reports/use-of-medicines-in-
the-us-2013#ims-form [http://perma.cc/RX4V-LXST]. 
 2.   See Facts About Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely 
/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm [http://perma.cc/GQ92-QEN4] [hereinafter 
Facts]. 
 3.   See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic 
Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 524-54 (2016) (describing what the authors call 
“Generation 3.0” tactics that use administrative processes, regulatory schemes, and drug 
modification to block or delay generic entry into the market). 
 4.   For details of how the Turing system was designed, see Feldman & Frondorf, supra 
note 3, at 536-38. See also Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight 
-increase-in- a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html [http://perma.cc/F26V-JSKR]. The price of the 
drug was as low as $1 in 2010, before a series of acquisitions. Id.; Andrew Pollack, New York 
Attorney General Examining Whether Turing Restricted Drug Access, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/new-york-attorney-general-examining 
-if-turing-restricted-drug-access.html [http://perma.cc/CTF6- DSNL]; Michael Carrier & 
Aaron Kesselheim, The Daraprim Price Hike and a Role for Antitrust, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/21/the-daraprim-price-hike-and-a-role-
for-antitrust [http://perma.cc/3Z7V-DQ6C]; Ed Silverman, How Martin Shkreli Prevents 
Generic Versions of His Pricey Pill, PHARMALOT (Oct. 5, 2015), http://pharmalot.com/how 
-martin-shkreli-prevents-generic-versions-of-his-pricey-pill [http://perma.cc/U78B-U6YE]. 
 5.  Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 538-39; see also Bertrand Marotte, Valeant’s Sales 
Network: Deciphering a Complex Web of Companies, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/valeants-sales-network-the-firms-and 
-chess-terms-tied-to-it/article27009058 [http://perma.cc/9D3F-9HJ8]; Jacquie McNish, et al., 
U.S. Attorney Charges Former Valeant, Philidor Executives, Alleging Fraud and Kickback 
Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-attorney-to-charge 
-two-valeant-philidor-executives-alleging-fraud-and-kickback-scheme-1479394276 
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One can understand the motivation behind such behavior. Delaying generic 
entry for a blockbuster drug—even by just a few months—can be worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars of additional revenue.6 To offer a simplistic example, Gilead’s 
Hepatitis C Drug, Sovaldi, was the top-selling drug in the United States in 2014, 
with $7.9 billion in sales.7 Three additional months at that rate would constitute 
$1.98 billion in sales.8 In fact, 55 drugs in the United States earned more than $1 
billion in sales in 2013.9 Three more months at that rate would constitute more 
than $300 million in sales for each company. 
The dollars at stake create a powerful incentive to keep searching for new 
pathways to delay generic competition. From society’s standpoint, one would prefer 
that companies search for pathways of treating human disease, rather than 
pathways of blocking competition. Thus, the process of exposing and shutting 
down avenues for generic delay is critical for keeping the generic system properly 
on track. 
With the anecdotes described above, as well as recent scholarship,10 concerns 
have swirled around the citizen petition process at the Food & Drug Administration 
(FDA). The FDA’s citizen petition process was created in the 1970s, along with 
similar programs at other agencies, and was intended to fashion more participatory 
regimes, in which ordinary citizens could access the administrative process.11 The 
theoretical underpinnings hypothesized that a participatory structure would 
prevent regulatory agencies from being captured by the very industries they were 
designed to police. Recent evidence suggests, however, that the FDA’s citizen 
petition process may have taken a different turn. We set out to analyze the issue. 
 
[http://perma.cc/JW5C-XSSN]; Katie Thomas & Matthew Goldstein, Former Drug Industry 
Executives Charged in Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/11/18/business/valeant-philidor-fraud-kickback-scheme.html?r=2 [http://perma.cc 
/ZL28-55EK]; Roddy Boyd, The King’s Gambit: Valeant’s Big Secret, S. INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORTING FOUND. (Oct. 19, 2015), http://sirf-online.org/2015/10/19/hidden-in-plain-sight-
valeants-big-crazy-sort-of-secret-story [http://perma.cc/N34K-B8TQ]. 
 6.   See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 503 n.23 (detailing examples). 
 7.   Lacie Glover, Here Are the Top-Selling Drugs in the US, TIME (June 26, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/3938166/top-selling-drugs-sovaldi-abilify-humira/?xid=soc 
_socialflow_twitter_money [http://perma.cc/C58U-PFZP]. 
 8.    Although competition would not reduce the sales to zero, a price drop of even a 
modest 10% would be worth $198 million for three months. 
 9.   U.S. Pharmaceutical Sales—2013, DRUGS.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.drugs.com 
/stats/top100/2013/sales [http://perma.cc/3Q4Z- TVZT]. 
 10.   See generally Michael Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249 (2012); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3. 
 11.   The following germinal texts describe the movement and debate its consequences. 
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY (1990); Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative 
Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1978); see also Reuel R. Schiller, 
Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1139 (2001); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t 
Figure Out About Controlling Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5 (2009); Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is 
Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921 (2007). 
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From an empirical perspective, we aimed to explore whether pharmaceutical 
companies are systematically using citizen petitions to try to delay FDA approval of 
generic competitors. To do this, we looked at the timing of when citizen petitions 
are filed by competitors during the approval process for generic drugs, as well as 
trends across time for this type of filing. We were looking for evidence that such 
petitions are being used as a last-ditch effort to delay generic entry as long as 
absolutely possible. 
Assembling this information was difficult, to say the least. As with all 
information about strategic behavior in pharmaceutical pricing, it must be 
painstakingly pieced together from scattered and incomplete public records. The 
Article below describes the extensive research undertaken to assemble this picture 
of a citizen’s pathway being used by drug companies as a delay tactic. 
It is a remarkable picture, indeed. Following are the key findings from the 
study: 
•   The FDA’s citizen petition pathway is one of the key pathways 
involved in the modern generation of generic drug delay, playing a 
role in various game-playing strategies. 
•   Citizen petitions from competitor companies—brand names and 
generics seeking to delay competitors—have essentially doubled since 
2003.  
•   Citizen petitions with the potential to delay generic entry have 
constituted a striking portion of the citizen petitions in recent years. 
Out of all citizen petitions filed at the FDA between 2000 and 2012 
(including those concerning tobacco, food, dietary supplements, 
medical devices, etc.), nearly 15% had the potential to delay a generic 
drug application, climbing to 20% in some years. 
•   Many citizen petitions in our data set appear to be a last-ditch effort 
to hold off generic competition. In fact, the most common category of 
all generic-related petitions was petitions filed within six months of 
generic approval. This is particularly striking given that the 
overwhelming majority of citizen petitions are denied.12 In other 
words, the results suggest that many competitor petitions are filed late 
in the game as a final effort to hold off competition just a little longer, 
even though they are unlikely to be successful. 
•   Congressional reforms enacted in 2007 have not stemmed the tide of 
such delay-related petitions. 
 
  
 
 12.   See Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-
Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 332-33, 333 tbl. 4 (2016) (finding that between 2011 and 
2015, the FDA denied 92% of section 505(q) citizen petitions, the type most often employed to 
oppose generic entry); Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 249, 274, 274 tbl.3 (finding that the 
FDA denied 81% of citizen petitions filed by competitors against drug companies between 2001 
and 2010). 
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The study provides empirical evidence that the citizen petition process at the 
FDA has now become a key avenue for strategic behavior by pharmaceutical 
companies to delay entry of generic competition. Why now? The answer is simple. 
For decades, pharmaceutical companies had a favored avenue for delaying generic 
competition. Courts have been slowly shutting down this technique, known as pay-
for-delay, in response to cases filed by the Federal Trade Commission and generic 
companies. With the handwriting on the wall, pharmaceutical companies have 
looked for other methods of delay. Our results show that the citizen petition process 
has become a key alternative. It is a far cry from the “participatory citizen” notion 
that fueled the creation of such avenues at regulatory agencies. 
As described above, the delay achieved through a citizen petition, even if the 
petition is eventually denied, can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in 
revenue for a drug company. The burden of that increased cost ultimately falls on 
consumers and the economy.13 Thus, this Article provides critical evidence for 
legislators and regulators in their efforts to ensure adequate competition and 
appropriate pricing in the health care sector. Following the protocols outlined in 
the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Open Letter on Ethical Norms,14 we are 
making all of our data public for future use by other academics. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the process for generic drug entry and 
details waves of tactics used in the past to block or delay the entry of generic 
competition. Part II explains the regulatory history of citizen petitions, focusing on 
changes to the process over time. Citizen petitions have long been a source of 
consternation for the FDA and other agencies, and a number of modifications have 
been made to the petitioning process in the hopes of curbing abuse, albeit with 
mixed success. These changes will factor into our quantitative analysis, as we split 
our data into periods divided by major changes to the citizen petition regulations. 
Part III describes, in detail, the methodology we used to obtain and identify all 
citizen petitions between 2000 and 2012 related to generic drugs, as well as every 
generic drug application approved between 2006 and 2015. These two data sets 
were then used to “match” citizen petitions with the most relevant generic drug 
application potentially affected by the petition, setting the stage for a comparison 
of when citizen petitions are filed relative to when generic drug applications are 
filed and approved. 
Part IV presents the results of our study, including descriptive statistics about 
the citizen petitions and generic drug applications we collected. We use dates from 
citizen petitions and generic drug applications to construct “timing” metrics that 
show the time that passes between when the generic application was filed and when 
the competitor’s citizen petition was filed, as well as between when the competitor’s 
citizen petition was filed and when the generic application was approved, among 
other calculations. 
Part V concludes by examining the nature of the problem and exploring three 
possible approaches to curb the behavior. These include: 1) a simple prohibition, if 
 
 13.   See infra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
 14.   See Feldman et al., Open Letter, supra note §, at 346-49. 
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one were to conclude that most behavior in the category is likely to be 
inappropriate; 2) procedural blocks to ensure that the behavior cannot create 
suboptimal results; or 3) punitive measures as a deterrent. Part V also includes 
recommendations regarding issues in FDA data collection and transparency. 
II.   THE GENERIC DRUG PROCESS AND HISTORIC EFFORTS AT DELAY 
A.   The Economic Landscape 
The advent of generic drugs in the United States has been one of the most 
significant sources of cost savings in modern health care. Specifically, the FDA 
estimates that consumers saved $254 billion in 2014 through generic competition, 
and achieved a total of $1.68 trillion of savings in the decade between 2005 and 
2014.15 The staggering cost reductions are the result of both widespread availability 
of generic drugs and the deep discounts that result in markets with generic 
competition. Over 80% of small-molecule drugs have generic equivalents, and more 
than 80% of all prescriptions are filled using generic medication.16 After generic 
competition begins, the price of most drugs eventually falls to 80-85% below the 
original brand-name cost.17 
Brand-name drug companies, who enjoy a monopoly in the market for a drug 
until generic entry, face a nearly instant plummet in market share and price. 
Considering that generic entry often coincides with the expiration of a brand-name 
company’s patents or FDA exclusivities, it is no surprise that looming generic 
competition is often referred to as the “patent cliff.”18 It is also not surprising that 
patent holders try to prevent falling into the approaching chasm using any means 
possible. 
Early delay tactics, still in play today, focused on settlements between brand-
name companies and potential generic entrants. As described below, the process 
for generic approval involves a detailed and stylized dance between original drug 
makers and their would-be competitors, which often results in litigation over the 
validity of the patent on the original drug or its application to the generic entrant.19 
 
 15.   GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2015), 
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report_2015.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/6YUR-9SVU] (data supplied by IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics); see Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, 
FDA). 
 16.   See Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, FDA); IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 1, at 51; 
Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation 6 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16431, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w16431.pdf [http://perma.cc/XY26-RBY6]. 
 17.   See Facts, supra note 2. 
 18.   See, e.g., Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 253 (using the term “patent cliff”). 
 19.   See infra text accompanying notes 27-40. 
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In the course of such litigation, some brand and generic companies have settled 
their disputes by entering into so-called “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” 
agreements, in which a generic applicant agrees to stay out of the market for a 
certain period of time in exchange for cash and other considerations. These deals 
often lead to years of delay and increased revenue valued in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars.20 From a litigation perspective, these agreements are unusual because 
they represent a transfer of value from a patent holder to an accused infringer. In 
contrast, lawsuits generally settle when the accused party agrees to pay an amount 
to the complaining party. 
The companies have argued that such settlements represent a reasonable 
assessment of the cost of continuing litigation and risks of losing a case, no matter 
how strong one’s position may be. Antitrust scholars and competition authorities 
have raised concerns, however, that such agreements allow the parties to keep 
prices artificially high and then share the resulting monopoly rents.21 Brand-name 
companies are able to preserve years of monopoly sales, and generics receive a share 
of those profits from the settlement payment, generally worth more than what the 
generic might make in a duopoly or in a competitive market. 
Most importantly, with benefits provided under Hatch-Waxman to the first 
generic filer, a pay-for-delay agreement frequently serves as a roadblock to any 
other competitors, preserving the monopoly-rent environment. In light of these 
effects, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has estimated that reverse payment 
settlements cost consumers upwards of $3.5 billion each year.22 
After years of debate and scrutiny of reverse payment settlements, the Supreme 
Court entered the conversation in FTC v. Actavis.23 While declining to find pay-
for-delay agreements presumptively illegal, the Court allowed an FTC case 
challenging a reverse payment to go forward and outlined a number of reasons why 
reverse payment settlements should be open to antitrust scrutiny.24 In the antitrust 
world, where the law moves at a glacial pace, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
 
 20.   For a more detailed explanation and history of delay tactics, see Feldman & Frondorf, 
supra note 3. 
 21.   See generally ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW (2012); Matthew Avery & 
Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs: Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction for Later 
Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013); Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of 
Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008); Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009); 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3; C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: 
Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009); 
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006); Steve D. Shadowen, Keith B. Leffler & Joseph T. Lukens, 
Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2009). 
 22.   See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company 
-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff [http://perma.cc/N3XY 
-MQJE]. 
 23.   Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 24.   Id. 
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was the equivalent of a minor temblor.25 The shock waves have filtered slowly 
through the lower courts as those courts have shaped the contours of antitrust 
analysis and ruled on what kinds of agreements should be subject to scrutiny. In 
particular, pharmaceutical companies have developed agreements far more 
complex than what the Supreme Court ruled on in Actavis, including ones that 
eliminate pure cash payments and provide consideration such as promotional deals, 
licensing agreements, research and development deals, and the settlement of 
multiple cases at once. 
Although the topic continues to percolate through the courts, pay-for-delay 
agreements appear to be on the decline. In the first full year after the Actavis 
decision, fiscal year 2014, the FTC labeled 21 settlements as potential pay-for-delay 
deals, down from 29 in fiscal year 2013 and the record high of 40 in fiscal year 
2012.26  
With settlements between brand-name companies and prospective generics 
coming under this substantial scrutiny in recent years, pharmaceutical companies 
have turned to new tactics to delay generic entry. These strategies make use of 
public FDA petition processes, inconsequential labeling changes, slight tweaks to 
existing drugs and formulations, and disingenuous safety concerns, among others, 
to block generic competition and obtain additional months of monopoly power. 
The move has been from collaboration with generic drug makers to obstruction of 
them. Even if these tactics are likely to fail in constructing a permanent generic 
blockade, they are relatively costless and easy to attempt; and even if they only 
secure a few months of last-ditch delay, those precious few months could still be 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, given that top-selling drugs may exceed $1 
billion in U.S. sales annually. The strategy is similar to futile measures to slow a 
sinking ship by tossing everything overboard; the outcome is essentially inevitable, 
but the timing is malleable. In this case, slowing submersion, even marginally, can 
be extremely valuable. 
B.   The Generic Approval Process 
Understanding pharmaceutical game-playing techniques requires at least a 
basic understanding of the process for approval of generic drugs.27 The passage of 
 
 25.   See Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of 
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63, 74-76 
(2014); see also Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 8-9, 47-49 (2014); 
Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 16 (2013). 
 26.  See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 3 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-
commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/X66Q-HV4H]. 
 27.   For a detailed description of the Hatch-Waxman process for approval of generic drugs, 
see generally Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical 
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the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 ushered in the modern era of generic medication 
through a number of regulations designed to ease the path of generics to the 
market.28 The Act introduced the concept of the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application, commonly referred to as an “ANDA,” which allows prospective 
generics to use existing clinical trial data to obtain approval of a drug bioequivalent 
to an existing drug. The development process can be completed without the threat 
of a patent infringement suit from the drug company already on the market. 
Although the term “ANDA” is familiar to those in the life science industry, we 
use the term “generic drug application” in most places, to avoid the confusion of a 
paper littered with insider acronyms. As one of the authors has noted in the past, 
writing in clear, simple language presses legal actors to be faithful to supportable 
logic, rather than subject to the whims of prejudice masked in obscurity.29 
In addition to an expedited approval process, Hatch-Waxman offers incentives 
for generics to challenge weak or invalid patents protecting drugs already on the 
market. The process begins with what is known as the “Orange Book.” When an 
original drug maker applies to the FDA for approval, the company is required to 
identify all patents protecting the drug. That list is publicized in an FDA document 
commonly known as the “Orange Book,” in reference to the orange cover on each 
volume.30 
When a generic company applies for permission to make a generic version of 
the drug down the road, it must make a certification in relation to each of the 
patents listed in the Orange Book, declaring, among other options, that the patent 
is expired, that the patent is irrelevant, or that the applicant will not enter the 
market until the expiration of the patent.31 One category of certifications, however, 
holds most of the action. So-called “Paragraph IV” certifications declare that one of 
the patents listed in the Orange Book is either invalid or will not be infringed by 
the generic drug application.32 A Paragraph IV certification initiates a stylized 
dance between the parties that generally results in litigation.33 
The process contains an incentive to encourage generic applicants to file 
 
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178, 178 nn.55-
56 (2008); Cheng, supra note 21; Feldman, supra note 21, at 158-78; Feldman & Frondorf, supra 
note 3; Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 21. 
 28.   Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). 
 29.   See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 180 (2009) (excerpted in Robin 
Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289 (2009) and discussing the 
dangers that arise when legal actors cloak themselves in scientific jargon); see also FELDMAN, THE 
ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 5-7, 174-95 (exploring the issue further). 
 30.   The formal name of the Orange Book is “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations.” Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2016), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov 
/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm [http://perma.cc/AU6U-XFWY]. 
 31.   21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III) (2012 & Supp. III 2015). 
 32.   Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 33.   See generally sources cited supra note 27. 
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Paragraph IV certifications declaring that one of the original drug maker’s patents 
is invalid or invalidly applied. The first generic company to submit such a 
certification is, with some stipulations, entitled to six months of marketing 
exclusivity for the generic drug, as long as the generic does not lose its patent 
infringement case.34 Thus, the first generic that meets this criteria will be the only 
competitor to the brand-name drug for its first six months on the market, a period 
that can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in sales for the generic.35 The 
benefit reflects concern over the presence of invalid patents within the system and 
is intended to give generic companies an incentive to battle with pharmaceutical 
companies whose patents are weak or applied to the wrong product.36 
Data on the results of Paragraph IV court cases confirm the presence of weak 
patents within the life science arena and the importance of the Paragraph IV 
process. For example, an FTC study of all such cases resolved on the merits between 
1992 and 2002 found that the generic company prevailed 73% of the time.37 
Cases resolved on the merits represent only a portion of the Paragraph IV 
certifications.38 Nevertheless, the FTC study offers striking evidence that, like high 
tech, life sciences also must worry about weak patents.39 
 
 34.   21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). After 2003 amendments to Hatch-Waxman, it is possible 
to forfeit the 180-day exclusivity period without losing a patent infringement case when certain 
criteria are met, such as a failure to market the generic within a certain period of time. Id. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D). Further, it is also possible that the brand-name drug company chooses not to bring 
litigation during the forty-five-day period. In this case, the first-filer still retains its rights to 180 
days of exclusivity. 
 35.  In fact, sales during this period can represent the majority of profits that can be 
potentially gained from generic entry. Avery, supra note 27, at 178 nn.55-56. As the number of 
competitors in a market increases, the price drops to the point where it approaches the marginal 
cost of producing the drug, thus nearing perfect completion and minimizing the amount of profit 
that any one seller can obtain. During the 180-day period, the FDA is not permitted to approve 
any other generic applications that have a Paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C 
§ 355(J)(5)(B)(iv)(I)-(II). However, this does not entirely prevent the presence of other 
competition. Brand-name companies have developed a technique in which they launch their own 
generic version of the drug at a lower price tier (or permit another company to do so), creating 
instant competition for the generic. These generics are often called “authorized generics.” See 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM 
IMPACT i (2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/P5EX-NKJR]; Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 522-24 (describing authorized generics in 
detail). 
 36.   See FELDMAN, supra note 21, at 161. 
 37.   FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY 16 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug 
-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/MF3N 
-MDMZ]. 
 38.   Cf. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities, 18 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 59-60 (2013) (empirical study of roughly 
13,000 patent lawsuits across four years showing, among other findings, that most patent lawsuits 
settle prior to a decision on the merits). 
 39.   See FELDMAN, supra note 21, at 170-77 (discussing the practice of attempting to refresh 
one’s patents by patenting extended release versions, alternative delivery methods, or other 
variations of the original product—a practice known as “evergreening”). 
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Hatch-Waxman led to the rapid proliferation of generics. The complexity of 
the system also created an environment ripe for abuse. From the pay-for-delay deals 
described above to other manipulations, courts, legislators, and regulators have 
engaged in an endless game of cat-and-mouse to close off avenues for manipulation 
as they are uncovered.40 The road now leads to the lowly citizen petition. 
In Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, authors 
Feldman and Frondorf refer to the idea of “Generation 3.0”—this most recent 
collection of generic delay strategies, connected by their efforts at obstruction of 
generics rather than collaboration between pharmaceutical companies.41 Our 
survey of all citizen petitions filed between 2000 and 2012 makes it clear that citizen 
petitions do not represent just one of these strategies; rather, petitions are the 
gateway to many identified forms of delay. Labeling changes that create more work 
for generics, requests to institute a safety-related “REMS” program of restricted 
distribution for a drug—many of these tactics are initiated through citizen 
petitions.42 Thus, short, cheap filings with the FDA—citizen petitions—are perhaps 
the most prominent way that small-scale, obstructionist delay is effectuated today. 
III.   CITIZEN PETITIONS 
The citizen petition process was mandated by Congress’ passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which requires federal agencies to create a formal 
route for the public to petition an agency to change, amend, or repeal an agency 
rule.43 As described above, the FDA’s citizen petition process can be traced back to 
the 1970s, a period in which courts and policy-makers encouraged the creation of 
pathways so that ordinary citizens could engage in the administrative process taking 
place at regulatory agencies.44 The FDA’s process allows petitioners to “request the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs to . . . (issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or 
order or take or refrain from any other form of administrative action).”45 Petitions 
 
 40.   See generally Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3 (describing three generations of 
strategies used by brand-name companies to deter and delay generic entry, along with 
administrative changes and congressional amendments that have tried, and failed, to keep pace). 
 41.   See generally Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 524. 
 42.   “REMS” is an abbreviation for Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies. The REMS 
program was instituted as part of the 2007 Food & Drug Administration Amendments Act. It 
gives the FDA the authority to require drug manufacturers to produce a REMS, essentially a set 
of safety strategies, when the potential risks of a medicine are a concern. See FDA Basics 
Webinar: A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (Mar 20, 2017), 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm325201.htm 
[http://perma.cc/B4ND-C23L]. 
 43.   5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012 & Supp. III 2015). 
 44.   See sources cited supra note 11. 
 45.   21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2016). A variation on the standard citizen petition also exists, 
known as a “petition for stay of agency action.” These petitions request that the FDA delay 
enforcement or the effective date of an administrative action. Id. § 10.35. They function and are 
governed similarly to citizen petitions, so we have grouped them together for the purposes of this 
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must state all factual and legal grounds for the petition, provide all relevant 
information (including that which may be unfavorable), and add an environmental 
or economic impact section if necessary.46 The agency must make a final grant or 
denial of the petition.47 
On its face, the citizen petition process should be a useful method for ensuring 
that the public can communicate its concerns to a key regulatory agency. A 
mechanism designed for concerned citizens and scientists to raise concerns about 
drugs, food, and FDA regulations, however, has seemingly turned into a 
playground for pharmaceutical companies to challenge drug applications, especially 
those related to pending generic applications. In many cases, the “concerned citizen” 
behind a petition is actually a large pharmaceutical company, seeking to stop or 
delay approval of a generic drug through a variety of different arguments. These 
include direct attacks against the generic’s application and its bioequivalence or 
clinical data; appeals to safety; calls to preserve or add new exclusivities for the 
brand-name drug; and more. Some petitions raise important or necessary issues; 
many others, however, seem frivolous or questionable. 
A.   Troubling Behavior in the Citizen Petition Process 
As an example of a troubling citizen petition we uncovered, consider the 
petition filed in 2007 by Mutual Pharmaceuticals, a company the FDA had already 
approved to sell a generic version of the blood pressure medicine felodipine.48 The 
petition sought to delay other generic companies from gaining approval. 
Specifically, the petition requested that the FDA not approve any new generic 
applications while it decided whether warnings should be added to the current drug 
labels regarding whether products containing certain forms of orange juice might 
affect absorption of the drug.49 The petition further suggested that all new generic 
drug approvals should be delayed until the FDA asked the original drug maker to 
 
Article, a categorization that the FDA has used as well. U.S. FOOD &. DRUG ADMIN., ANNUAL 
REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND 
PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION  FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 1 (2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads 
/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ReportsBudgets 
/UCM369793.pdf [http://perma.cc/76VK-ZRR3] (“Both citizen petitions and petitions for stay 
of agency action will be collectively referred to as ‘petitions’ throughout this Report.”). 
 46.   21 C.F.R. § 10.30; see also Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 260. 
 47.   21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2). The Agency can also dismiss the petition if changes since the 
date of submission have rendered the petition moot. See id. 
 48.   See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., to Robert Dettery, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Mut. Pharm. Co. (Apr. 17, 
2008), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0123-0009 [http://perma.cc 
/D53D-8GQX] [hereinafter Response to Citizen Petitions]. Felodipine is also branded as Plendil. 
 49.   Letter from Robert Dettery, Vice President, Mut. Pharm. Co., to Div. of Dockets 
Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Nov. 29, 2007), https://www.regulations.gov/document 
?D=FDA-2007-P-0123-0002 [http://perma.cc/MNP9-7WDE]. 
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specify which form of orange juice was used in its studies.50 Of course, as a currently 
approved seller of generic felodipine, the company writing the citizen petition 
would be free to continue selling the existing labels based on existing study 
information. 
Mutual Pharmaceuticals explained that its citizen petition was motivated by a 
study showing different effects of Seville orange juice versus “regular” orange juice 
on metabolism.51 Seville oranges are a smaller, more bitter orange often used for 
marmalade and liqueurs.52 The FDA, however, was unimpressed.53 In its response 
to the petition, the Agency stated, “we do not believe that the results of the 
Malhotra study present a serious safety concern.”54 In fact, the FDA seemed to have 
a clear disdain for the claims made in the petition: 
[Y]ou hypothesize that there may be clinical consequences associated with the 
coadminstration of felodipine and components of Seville orange juice consumed 
in this form. You have offered no data to support this hypothesis. In fact, we 
searched the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) database and found no 
reported interactions between Seville or bitter orange products and any drug 
product.55 
A footnote hinted at the FDA’s skepticism of Mutual’s motives for filing the 
petition, questioning the truthfulness of Mutual’s affirmations: “You have certified 
that you first became aware of the information upon which you have based Petition 
1 (i.e., the Malhotra study) on November 5, 2007. We note, however, the Malhotra 
study was published in 2001 and predates approval of Mutual’s [generic 
application].”56 
Unsurprisingly, Mutual was the first company to receive approval to sell 
generic felodipine, receiving approval from the FDA in 2004. Mylan, a competing 
generic drug company, filed the next generic application in the first quarter of 2007, 
just months before Mutual filed its citizen petition.57 The FDA denied the citizen 
petition the following year, on April 17, 2008—the same day that Mylan’s generic 
application was approved. 58 The timing indicates that Mutual’s “orange juice 
petition” was one of the last barriers to final approval. Thus, a last-minute, baseless 
 
 50.   See id. 
 51.   See id. at 2. 
 52.   See id. at 6. 
 53.   See Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 48, at 2. 
 54.   Id. at 4. The FDA did grant Mutual’s request that a portion of the brand-name Plendil 
labeling stating that “[o]range juice does not appear to modify the kinetics of Plendil” be qualified 
to not imply that orange juice has no effects on the kinetics of Plendil, even if the minimal effect 
does not appear to affect the safety or efficacy of the drug. 
 55.   Id. 
 56.   Id. at 3 n.3. 
 57.   See Feldman et al., Database, supra note §, ANDA No. 78855. 
 58.   See Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 48, at 1; Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved 
Drug Products—Products on ANDA 078855, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2017), http:// 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=078855 
[http://perma.cc/6KC5-9B8V]. 
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petition about types of orange juice cost consumers untold millions by delaying the 
approval of a second generic for felodipine.59 
This example of felodipine fits the rumors swirling about the current modus 
operandi for citizen petitions—pharmaceutical companies make a facially 
interesting, scientific-sounding claim (for example, Seville orange juice actually 
does increase absorption and peak drug concentration) timed to the months right 
before generic application approval, and the claims are eventually denied by the 
FDA. Despite the eventual denial, the delays cost consumers untold sums and waste 
governmental resources.60 
B.   Changes to the FDA Citizen Petition Process 
After years of hearings and debate on numerous FDA regulatory issues, 
Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) 
in 2007. The Act included the largest reform of the citizen petition process in the 
program’s thirty-year history.61 These changes attempted to address concerns with 
citizen petitioning at the FDA, ranging from growing petition backlogs to signs 
that the process was being used inappropriately to delay entry of generic drugs. The 
Amendments aimed to curb attempts to both block and delay the entry of 
generics.62 
Specifically, the 2007 Amendments added subsection “(q)” to section 355 of 
U.S. Code Title 21, where most of the legislation relating to generic applications 
already resided. This new provision generally is called “505(q)” in academic and 
regulatory discussions, and the petitions that fall under it are called “505(q) 
petitions.” 
Section 505(q) applies a new set of regulations to all citizen petitions that ask 
the FDA to take action related to a pending generic application.63 Most notably, 
 
 59.  For example, sales of Plendil were $251 million in 2007, even with a generic already on 
the market. See Press Release, Mylan Pharm. Inc., Mylan Announces Final FDA Approval for 
Felodipine Extended-Release Tablets, USP (Apr. 21, 2008), http://newsroom.mylan.com/press 
-releases?item=122579 [http://perma.cc/5BHU-99HS]. 
 60.   See, e.g., Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 252, 283-85 (detailing the saga of a 
citizen petition that delayed generic entry of the depression drug Wellbutrin XL for 133 days, 
costing consumers $600 million). 
 61.   FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 62.   See Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 263 (quoting 153 CONG. REC. 25,047 (2007)) 
(discussing testimony of Senator Edward Kennedy that “[t]he citizen petition provision is 
designed to address attempts to derail generic drug approvals. Those attempts, when successful, 
hurt consumers and the public health”). 
 63.   Section 505(q) covers citizen petitions related to two categories of FDA approval 
applications. These are abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) and other forms of 
applications that rely on investigations not performed by or for the applicant. The latter form is 
referred to as a 505(b)(2) application. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(b)(2) (Oct. 
1999), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/. . ./Guidances/ucm079345.pdf [http://perma.cc 
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the section requires that the FDA respond to all such petitions within 180 days.64 
In 2012, this deadline was further shortened to 150 days through the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA).65 Approval of a generic 
application cannot be delayed because of a citizen petition beyond the 180-day (and 
later 150-day) review period, unless it is determined that a delay is necessary for 
public health reasons.66 
Most importantly, § 505(q) contains provisions intended to deter those who 
would file citizen petitions to delay generic competition. If a citizen petition relating 
to a generic application falls under § 505(q), the person filing the petition must 
certify that the petition is not frivolous, all information favorable and unfavorable 
has been provided, and the petitioner did not intentionally delay filing the petition. 
The citizen petition also must provide the date when the filer first became aware of 
the concern and the names of those who are funding the petition.67 
Finally, § 505(q) grants the FDA the power to summarily deny any petition it 
believes was filed with the “primary purpose” of delaying generic approval if the 
petition also does not “on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues.”68 
Together, the provisions of § 505(q) were meant to end the abuse of citizen 
petitions by pharmaceutical companies. 
The major changes to the citizen petition process beginning in 2007 serve as a 
natural break point in our data, allowing us to observe any effects of the legislation 
along with trends across time. In addition, some of the data reports mandated by 
the 2007 Amendments provide interesting information for our exploration.69 
IV.   METHODOLOGY 
A.   Overview 
As described above, anecdotes have swirled for years suggesting that drug 
companies abuse the citizen petition process to keep generics off the market.70 We 
 
/EA7F-L7B4] [hereinafter 505(b)(2) GUIDANCE]. 
 64.   21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(f) (2012 & Supp. III 2015). 
 65.   Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 
Stat. 993 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The FDASIA also 
extended the stipulations of § 505(q) to biosimilar applications, which are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 66.   21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1) (2012 & Supp. III 2015). 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Id. 
 69.   See infra text accompanying notes 127-139. 
 70.   See, e.g., Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3; Ameet Sarpatwari, Jerry Avorn & Aaron 
S. Kesselheim, Using a Drug-Safety Tool to Prevent Competition, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1476, 
1477 (2014) (citing Letter from Daniel E. Troy & Gary L. Veron, Attorneys for Celgene Corp., to 
Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 20, 2007), https://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0113-0002 [http://perma.cc/CHN4-H5XW]). Most importantly, 
Carrier and Wander, who documented a rise in citizen petitions in general, suggested that the 
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set out to take a quantitative look. Specifically, our goal was to empirically explore 
whether pharmaceutical companies systematically use the citizen petition process 
to delay entry of generic drugs. 
To approach the question, we sought to analyze the timing of when citizen 
petitions are filed during the generic drug approval process and the frequency with 
which petitions that have the potential to delay are filed. We hypothesized that such 
petitions would be filed towards the end of the approval process to put up one more 
roadblock in the path of successful approval of a generic drug. 
Assembling the necessary information from the FDA’s publicly available files 
was tremendously difficult. Although the FDA publishes a large amount of 
information on its public website, and more in hard copy through its Orange 
Book,71 much important information is absent. The necessary information often 
must be pieced together or estimated; in some cases, it simply cannot be located. 
For example, as will be described in more detail below, the FDA does not always 
publicly reveal the dates when generic applications are filed. We tracked down 
many of those dates by reading PDFs of various letters in the files of approved 
applications. For many others, however, we had to develop a method of identifying 
the likely quarter in which an application was filed by working from the FDA’s file 
numbering systems.  
The FDA citizen petition files also do not always link to or indicate which 
specific generic application the petition relates to—information that is important 
for tracking the timing of citizen petitions in relation to the application process for 
a particular generic drug. Moreover, prior to 2007, the FDA citizen petition files 
did not explicitly denote when a citizen petition targeted a generic application. 
Despite these challenges, we set out to assemble a data set of citizen petitions 
that had the potential to delay generic applications, along with the relevant generic 
application and timing data. All of this information had to be assembled by piecing 
together information from the citizen petition letters and the various generic 
application files. 
Through this approach, we assembled relevant data sets including 1) citizen 
petitions filed between 2000 and 2012 that had the potential to delay generic 
applications, along with their filing dates; 2) generic applications approved between 
the beginning of 2006 and the end of 2015; and, 3) the quarters in which the generic 
applications were filed and the specific dates on which they were approved. These 
data sets allowed us to analyze the timing of when citizen petitions are filed during 
the generic drug approval process and the frequency with which petitions that have 
the potential to delay are filed. In simplified form, the process can be summarized 
as follows: 
  
 
rise might be a sign of delay behavior. See Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 269-70, 283-86 
(documenting empirically a rise in citizen petitions and detailing two anecdotal examples of 
petitions that resulted in delay, one related to the depression drug Wellbutrin and one related to 
the insomnia drug Ambien). 
 71.   See supra text accompanying note 30 (describing the Orange Book). 
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1)  We compiled all FDA citizen petitions and related documents filed between 
2000 to 2012. 
2)  We identified citizen petitions related to pharmaceuticals, with a particular 
focus on generic drugs. 
3)  We read each remaining citizen petition and determined which of these 
petitions were related to generic drugs or had the power to delay generic 
approval, regardless of the merits or circumstances of the petition. 
4)  We constructed a data set of all generic applications approved between 2006 
and 2015, recording the approval date for each application. 
5)  We compiled filing dates for the generic applications, pulling them when 
available from PDFs of letters within the FDA’s databases. When filing 
information was not publicly available, we were able to estimate a filing 
date down to the quarter-year for most drugs. 
6)  We matched each citizen petition with the generic application most 
relevant to the requests made in the petition. 
7)  Using these citizen petition-generic application pairs, we constructed 
metrics with the goal of isolating the timing of petitions during the generic 
drug approval process. 
 
The subsections below describe the process in detail. As will be evident, 
collecting and assembling the data required extensive effort. The amount of effort 
required to extract the information from public sources, along with our 
commitment to open and ethical academic data,72 prompted us to make the data 
sets fully available to the public.73 We hope other academics will be able to use the 
data for future research. 
B.   Methodology Details 
1.   Compiling All Citizen Petitions Filed Since 2000 
To begin our analysis, we compiled all documents related to citizen petitions 
that were filed with the FDA between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2012. 
We limited our data set to citizen petitions filed prior to 2013 because test analyses 
indicated that citizen petitions filed after 2013 frequently related to drugs that had 
not yet been approved. Without final approval files, one cannot find much of the 
information necessary for analysis. One also cannot reach timing conclusions about 
events within the approval process, given that the process is still underway. 
The citizen petition documents were obtained using two sources. The first is 
an application program interface made available by Regulations.gov, a website 
provided by the federal government to serve as a searchable repository for 
 
 72.   See Feldman et al., Open Letter, supra note §. 
 73.   See  Feldman et al., Database, supra note §. 
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regulatory documents. The interface allows data to be queried and stored in formats 
easily accessible to data analysis languages. For the period from 2000 to 2012, we 
obtained 19,520 documents. Multiple documents, however, can correspond to a 
single citizen petition docket number. For example, supplemental data, support 
letters, and the FDA’s actual response are different types of documents that may be 
listed separately but correspond to a single citizen petition. The 19,520 documents 
are linked to a total of 1,790 citizen petitions filed between 2000 and 2012 and 
archived online. 
One should note, however, that the FDA’s database on Regulations.gov may be 
incomplete. In addition, if the FDA’s database has inconsistent labeling, the search 
may not have located every document. We are aware of at least a few citizen 
petitions that did not appear in our search of Regulations.gov because the FDA did 
not digitally categorize them as citizen petitions, but which we later added into our 
data set. 
The second source is the FDA Law Blog’s Citizen Petition Tracker, which 
keeps a record of citizen petitions that are related to generic drug applications.74 
The Citizen Petition Tracker is a privately assembled data set available to the public. 
This data set, however, only reaches back to October 2007. When using data from 
FDA Law Blog, we hand-checked each of the blog’s inclusions and sampled the 
blog’s exclusions for each year, testing them against our own sorting of the 
information available from the FDA. We found no errors in the FDA Law Blog’s 
data, and we believe it identifies a small number of citizen petitions that 
Regulations.gov fails to label as citizen petitions. 
2.   Identifying Citizen Petitions that Could Delay Generic Competition 
With the full data set of citizen petitions in hand, we turned to identifying 
citizen petitions with the power to delay pending or forthcoming generic 
applications. This process involved two steps for removing non-relevant petitions: 
1) removing petitions whose titles or categories indicated on their face that they 
were unrelated to delay of generic competition; and 2) removing petitions by 
viewing the content of the petition and related documents in full. 
a.   Removing Citizen Petitions Unrelated on Their Face 
Our first step in eliminating citizen petitions unrelated to our inquiry was to 
remove petitions regarding other areas of FDA oversight. These included citizen 
petitions related to food (e.g. “Revise The Labeling Requirements for Eggs Sold In 
the United States”), medical devices (e.g. “Reclassification for Mobile Bearing Knees 
from Class III and Class II”), tobacco (e.g. “Reclassify Nicotine Vaporizers (E-
 
 74.   FDA LAW BLOG, http://www.fdalawblog.net [http://perma.cc/BUL6-PB57] (follow 
“FDA Citizen Petition Tracker” hyperlink). Once again, a similar method was used for 
verification by Carrier and Wander in their empirical look at citizen petitions. See Carrier & 
Wander, supra note 10, at 118. 
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cigarettes) from ‘Drug-Device Combination’ to ‘Tobacco Product’”), and dietary 
supplements (e.g. “Treat Weight Loss Claims for Dietary Supplements as Disease 
Claims”). After filtering out all of the above categories of petitions, the initial 1,790 
petitions from 2000-2012 were narrowed to 1,158 petitions. Thus, 65% of all citizen 
petitions filed at the FDA during the period from 2000 to 2012 were in some way 
related to pharmaceuticals. 
Next, we removed drug-related petitions whose docket titles indicated that 
they were most likely unrelated to the possible obstruction of generic drug 
competition under consideration in our study. Thus, petitions related to biologic 
drugs were excluded. Biologic drugs are complex medications—such as antibodies, 
hormones, and proteins—that are derived from cells. Unlike the small-molecule 
drugs with which most people are widely familiar—such as aspirin—biologics and 
their generic “biosimilars” undergo a separate approval process, governed by a 
regulatory structure other than Hatch-Waxman.75 The biosimilar approval process 
differs substantially from Hatch-Waxman and is still in its infancy. In fact, the FDA 
approved the first biosimilar in March 2015, well beyond the 2000-2012 period of 
our study.76 Thus, analyses of potential delay tactics in the biosimilars regulatory 
pipeline are better suited for a different paper. 
Petitions related to the approval of new animal drugs or generic animal drugs 
were also removed, given that they exist in a different class than standard small-
molecule medications. 
We further chose to eliminate citizen petitions filed by third-party advocacy 
groups, rather than competitors, because we were looking for efforts by potential 
competitors to derail competition. An example of such a third-party petition is 
“Add a Black Box Warning About the Increased Risks of Heart Attacks and Other 
Cardiovascular Dangers to the Product Labels of all Testosterone-Containing 
Drugs Presently on the Market in the U.S.,” filed by “Public Citizen,” an advocacy 
group and think tank.77 
One cannot eliminate the possibility that third-party groups such as these 
might collude with a pharmaceutical company or be unwittingly roped into 
behavior that has the happy coincidence of advancing an anticompetitive goal. 
Elements of the pharmaceutical industry have indeed taken heat in recent years for 
efforts to influence and finance academics and third-party groups.78 Given the 
 
 75.   See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 76.   See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. FDA Approves First Biosimilar Product, 
Zarxio (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements 
/ucm436648.htm [http://perma.cc/D9GN-9UUE]. 
 77.   Letter from Sidney Wolfe & Michael Carome, Pub. Citizen’s Health Research Group, 
to Margaret A. Hamburg, Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Feb. 25, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-0258-0001 [http://perma.cc/LHM9 
-T88Q]. 
 78.   See Feldman et al., Open Letter, supra note §, at 341-43 (describing conflict of interest 
examples in life science research). 
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source of these petitions, however, and the fact that this set of petitions rarely 
singled out specific generics, we chose not to include safety-related petitions filed 
by third parties in our analysis of timing relationships. 
We also removed two defined categories of drug petitions most often filed by 
prospective generics seeking a route to the market—petitions that promote 
competition rather than seeking to restrict it. The first category is “ANDA 
suitability” petitions. A suitability petition is a request from a potential generic 
manufacturer to file an approval application for a drug that differs slightly from the 
original reference drug in characteristics such as route of administration, dosage 
form, and strength.79 
The second category is “discontinuation petitions,” which could also be 
described as “withdrawal determination petitions.” When a drug is discontinued or 
removed from the market, the FDA must determine that the drug was not removed 
for reasons of safety or effectiveness before allowing it to be referenced in a generic 
application. Generic hopefuls can file a discontinuation petition asking the FDA to 
make this determination so a generic application can be filed.80 Given that both 
suitability and withdrawal petitions are, by definition, designed to allow additional 
generic entry, rather than to block or restrict entry, they were removed from our 
final database.  
b.   Removing Citizen Petitions Unrelated Based on Their Content 
The second step in eliminating citizen petitions unrelated to our inquiry 
involved viewing each remaining petition docket in full. The number of documents 
available in each docket varies considerably, and our determinations were based on 
all available materials, including the petitions, interim FDA correspondence, and 
the FDA’s available response. Our goal was to look at timing—not to make our own 
judgments on the legitimacy of any particular issue raised. 
Once again, we sought to eliminate citizen petitions that had little or no 
relation to pending or approaching generic drug applications or were unrelated to 
the possibility of delay. Thus, we eliminated citizen petitions that would meet 
criteria used in the previous section for deletion, but for which that was not 
immediately apparent from the docket title, such as ANDA suitability, withdrawal, 
and third-party safety petitions. 
In addition, citizen petitions related to new drug applications (NDAs) were 
taken out of the final database, given that they are generally unrelated to generic 
drug competition. One important exception is a specific category of new drug 
applications classified as “505(b)(2)s.” Section 505(b)(2) applications fall somewhere 
 
 79.   See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY AND 
PROCEDURES: ANDA SUITABILITY PETITIONS (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices 
/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM365676.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CG3F-XZXZ]. 
 80.   21 C.F.R. § 314.161(a)-(e) (2016). 
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between pure applications for a new drug and applications for a generic drug. They 
are similar to filing an ANDA suitability petition in that both rely on existing data 
from existing drugs but involve drugs that differ from the existing ones in some 
aspect, such as formulation, dosage, treatment indication, or over-the-counter 
status.81 
As described above, we chose to eliminate ANDA suitability petitions from our 
data set on the theory that these represent an attempt by a generic company to enter 
the market and thereby broaden competition. In contrast, the 505(b)(2) citizen 
petitions that we kept within the data set represented attempts by other companies 
to block the entry of drugs—ones that are closely related to already-marketed 
pharmaceuticals and go through an approval process similar to approval for generic 
drugs.82 
Similarly eliminated were those petitions that referred to drugs already on the 
market, often requesting that the FDA declare a drug “misbranded” or require 
labeling charges. Since these petitions refer to generic applications that have already 
been approved, they generally do not have the potential to delay generic approval, 
although they could potentially cause removal of the drug from the market.83  
 
 81.   See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 505(b)(2) 
GUIDANCE, supra note 63; supra text accompanying note 79 (describing ANDA suitability 
petitions). New drug applications (NDAs) fall under section 505(b)(1), and generic drug 
applications (ANDAs) generally fall under section 505(j). Suitability petitions and 505(b)(2)s are 
quite similar in the types of drugs that are eligible, but the differing processes (petition vs. 
application) appeal differently to generic companies depending on individual circumstances. 
Furthermore, the proposed differences in a drug implicated in a suitability petition cannot require 
new evidence that the new drug is safe and effective. An example of change that might not raise 
safety or effectiveness questions is when a generic proposes to a sell an intermediate dosage of an 
approved drug—say, a 300 mg tablet when 200 mg and 400 mg tablets are already approved for 
the brand-name version of the drug. See Jennifer King, ANDA Sustainability Petition vs 
505(b)(2), CAMARGO PHARM. SERVS.: 505(b)(2) BLOG (June 12, 2009), http://camargopharma.com 
/2009/06/anda-suitability-petition-vs-505b2 [http://perma.cc/8QKA-5G5J]. 
 82.   Notably, the § 505(q) requirements added in the 2007 Amendments apply to citizen 
petitions related to both ANDAs and § 505(b)(2) applications. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF ACTION 
SUBJECT TO SECTION 505(q) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY 4-5 (1st rev. Nov. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs 
/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm079353.pdf [hereinafter 505(q) 
GUIDANCE]; see also supra text accompanying notes 61-68 (describing the 2007 Amendments and 
§ 505(q)). 
 83.   This criterion is generally in line with current law and the guidance the FDA released 
interpreting the provisions of § 505(q) of the 2007 Amendments. First, § 505(q)(1)(A) specifically 
refers to pending applications, and the FDA has interpreted the Amendments to say that § 505(q) 
applies “only to petitions for which, at the time the petition is submitted, at least one ANDA, 
505(b)(2) application, or biosimilar application related to the subject matter is pending.” CTR. FOR 
DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 505(q) GUIDANCE, supra note 82, at 
6. It is important to note that our data set includes three citizen petitions filed on the same 
day or after the FDA approved the targeted generic application. These petition docket titles are 
FDA-2007-P-0349 (filed the same day as generic approval), FDA-2008-P-0117 (filed thirty 
days after generic approval), and FDA-2008-P-0616 (filed eight days after generic approval). We 
included FDA-2007-P-0349 because it was filed on the same day as generic approval, and without 
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Finally, when the relation to generics was tenuous or unclear, we chose not to 
include the petition in our data set. For example, a number of petitions referred to 
a generic company’s request to allow a drug to certify to multiple branded drugs, 
requests to list or delist patents from the Orange Book, and so on. While it is 
possible that some of these petitions may have been part of a generic delay scheme, 
our goal was to be as conservative as possible and err on the side of understating 
any potential results. 
c.   The Final Citizen Petition Pool 
After removing the above categories, the remaining citizen petitions included 
only those with the potential to delay a pending or forthcoming generic competitor. 
The decision to include a citizen petition in the data set was based solely on the 
topic of the petition, and no attempt was made to judge the merits of the issues 
raised in the petition.  
Many of the citizen petitions in the final pool specifically ask the FDA to stay 
or delay approval of a generic application. These citizen petitions frequently raise 
concerns about safety or incomplete bioequivalence or clinical testing, with 
bioequivalence testing a particularly prevalent topic. Many of these petitions ask 
the FDA to stay approval of a generic drug until the applicant presents evidence 
that the FDA already requires for approval of a generic drug. This type of petition 
essentially forces the FDA to make a redundant ruling that a certain type of testing 
is required, when in fact, that testing is already required. 
These redundant petitions lead to a number of FDA rulings that grant a 
 
the citizen petition filer knowing the exact date the FDA planned to approve the targeted drug, 
the petition could have had delay-related consequences. We included FDA-2008-P-0117 because 
it specifically asked for a stay of the FDA’s approval, asserting its Paragraph IV first-filer 
certification and exclusivities. The petition also requests the FDA to stay approval on all other 
pending generic applications until the Federal Circuit renders a judgment on its Paragraph IV 
challenge; therefore, the petition attempts to delay generic approval and should be included in 
our dataset. See Letter from Bert. W. Rein, et al., Attorneys for Apotex, Inc., to Div. of Dockets 
Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Feb. 13, 2008), https://www.regulations.gov/document 
?D=FDA-2008-P-0117-0001 [http://perma.cc/LY32-WY2T]. We included FDA-2008-P-0616 
because the citizen petition filer concedes that the FDA already approved a generic drug 
application, but requests that the FDA withdraw the approval and direct the applicant to refile as 
a 505(b)(2) application, rather than an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). See Letter 
from David L. Rosen, Attorney for Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc., to Dockets Mgmt. Branch, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 13 (Nov. 25, 2008), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA 
-2008-P-0616-0001 [http://perma.cc/7D8B-2667]). The difference between the two types of 
applications relates to the extent to which the generic drug differs from the brand-name drug. 
See supra note 63 & infra text accompanying notes 85-86. All three petitions described in this 
footnote were denied or declared moot, and thus, the date of approval of the generic application 
did not change. In calculating the time between when the citizen petition was filed and the 
relevant generic drug was approved for these three, we note that two of them occurred within a 
month after approval. Thus, we could have created an additional category for them representing 
negative time. To avoid skewing calculations and descriptive statistics, however, we chose to 
record their timing as the lowest positive category of within zero months. 
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petition while not actually imposing any new requirements on the generic 
applicant. The result may be a petition that is granted in part and denied in part, 
with the granted portion no more than a formality that lacks practical 
significance.84 
Consider the FDA’s response to a citizen petition that requested a stay of 
generic versions of Argatroban, a drug to prevent blood clotting. In its response, 
the FDA acknowledges that the actions granted in the petition are merely those 
already required under FDA policy, stating that “[t]o the extent it is consistent with 
our current policies, we grant your request.”85 
Other citizen petitions remaining in the pool ask that the FDA direct a generic 
applicant to re-file its application in a different form, changing it from an ANDA 
(the category for applications that reference an existing drug) to a 505(b)(2) (the 
category for applications that reference an existing drug but differ slightly in 
formulation, dosage, treatment indication, etc.) or demand that a generic applicant 
revise its application to reference additional patents. All of the requests would add 
additional burdens on a generic applicant to comply. Thus, they are best classified 
as petitions with the potential to delay generics. 
For example, one petition uses a bioequivalence issue to suggest that  
the Agency require the applicant(s) to withdraw the ANDA(s) and resubmit it as 
an application(s) under section 505(b) . . . unless the ANDA applicant product is 
formulated with rsCT and is bio-identical in terms of biological impurities and an 
in vivo bioequivalency study has been completed and has met all bioequivalency 
criteria.86  
Such a request could represent a legitimate concern, or it could be a redundancy 
request, asking the FDA to require that the generic applicant do what all generic 
applicants must already do—prove bioequivalence. As noted above, we made no 
judgment about the legitimacy of the request in assembling the pool. 
Another category of petitions has a less direct link to delaying generic approval. 
On occasion, pharmaceutical companies do not address specific generic applications 
or even the topic of generic approval in their citizen petition. Rather, the branded 
company requests that it receive additional exclusivities from the FDA or retain 
exclusivities that the company perceives to be under threat.87 We have chosen to 
 
 84.   See Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 261, 266; see also id. at 261 (noting that the 
FDA’s Director of the Office of Generic Drugs has made a similar observation, saying that “when 
petitions are granted, in whole or in part, it is often because the FDA already has the proposed 
scientific or legal standard in place or is already planning to take the action that the petition 
requests”). 
 85.   See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., to Richard D. Kelly, Attorney for Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Corp. 8-9 
(Aug. 19, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-P-0115-0006 [https:// 
perma.cc/5W6R-N2EC]. 
 86.   See, e.g., Letter from David L. Rosen, supra note 83, at 4. 
 87.   For example, Petition FDA-2010-P-0188 asks the FDA to “confirm,” among other 
related requests, that the “FDA will grant 180-day marketing exclusivity to Actavis’ ANDA 
No. 77-302.” Letter from Chad A. Landmon, Attorney for Actavis Elizabeth LLC, to Div. of 
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categorize these petitions as potentially related to generic delay because gaining 
exclusivity pushes back the window for generic entry. Adding exclusivity is thus an 
attempt to extend the current state of the market—in which only a brand-name firm 
can compete, or only a brand-name firm and a first-filer can compete, for example—
which, for existing sellers, is preferable to having a new generic enter the space. 
Interestingly, one petition filed by a pharmaceutical company openly identifies the 
relationship between its exclusivity request and delay of competitors: “[T]he 
requested stay would . . . prevent the approval of any ANDA or Section 505(b)(2) 
application referencing the Ziana™ NDA during the 3-year [sic] of market 
exclusivity that would be earned by the Ziana™ application if [the petitioner’s 
other] citizen petition is granted.”88 
The final pool of citizen petitions with the potential to delay introduction of 
generic drugs consisted of 249 citizen petitions filed between 2000 and 2012. This 
number represents a striking portion of the citizen petitions filed at the FDA during 
that period. In fact, 22% of citizen petitions related in some way to drugs89 and 14% 
of all citizen petitions filed on any topic at the FDA90 in those years had the 
potential to delay the entry of generics. 
3.   Timing of the Citizen Petitions Relative to Generic Applications 
For each of the 249 citizen petitions in the data set, we attempted to glean data 
about the timing relationship between the petition and the generic application 
implicated by the petition. Namely, we wanted to know how much time had passed 
between when the relevant generic application was filed and when the citizen 
petition was filed. We also wanted to track how much time had passed between 
when the citizen petition was filed and when the generic application was approved. 
Calculating these statistics required us to have information on when generic 
applications were filed and approved. Although one would expect such information 
to be readily available in the FDA’s public information, that is not the case. 
a.   Filing Dates for Generic Applications 
The FDA searchable database contains readily available information regarding 
approval dates for most generic drugs, to the specificity of month and day. Filing 
dates, however, are not so transparent.91 Assembling information on when a 
 
Documents Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 2 (Apr. 6, 2010), https://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=FDA-2010-P-0188-0001 [http://perma.cc/T6YZ-9AKJ]. 
 88.   See Letter from Donald O. Beers & Joshua M. Glasser, Attorneys for Medicis Pharm. 
Corp., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0295-0003 [http://perma.cc/F5VH-TEHV]. 
 89.   That is, 249 of 1,158 citizen petitions filed were related in some way to 
pharmaceuticals. 
 90.   That is, 249 of 1,790 citizen petitions filed on any topic at the FDA. 
 91.   Approval dates are, for the most part, readily available through the FDA’s searchable 
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generic application was filed required a combination of sleuthing through the 
various letters in the generic drug’s public file and estimating based on information 
known from other drug applications. This process allowed us to determine with 
reasonable certainty the quarter in which an application was filed for 73% of the 
generic applications in our pool. 
In particular, the way that docket numbers are assigned to generic applications 
makes it possible to estimate filing dates for those generic applications that do not 
have publicly available approval letters. To do this, however, we needed to look at 
the full set of all generic applications approved by the FDA between the beginning 
of 2006 and the end of 2015, which consists of 4,222 applications.92 2006 was the 
starting point of our range because we determined that very few drugs approved 
before this year were implicated in our set of citizen petitions filed between 2000 
and 2012, and 2015 was the end point because it was the latest year for which 
generic approval data was available at the time we began collecting relevant 
information.93 
 
database of approved drugs, known as Drugs@FDA. See Drugs@FDA, supra note 58. For 
example, anyone can search Drugs@FDA for information on ANDA No. 90153 (a generic version 
of Ambien CR), and the page clearly denotes an approval date of March 25, 2013. But filing dates 
are not so transparent. The FDA does not have a standard data field in Drugs@FDA for ANDA 
filing date—clicking the “Approval Date(s) and History, Letters, Labels, Reviews” link on the page 
for ANDA No. 90153 results in no history, letters, or documents whatsoever other than a table 
displaying the approval date for the drug. This was the case for the majority of ANDAs we 
explored in the Drugs@FDA database. The only way to obtain filing dates is through rarely posted 
approval documents in a drug’s “Approval Date(s) and History, Letters, Labels, Reviews” table. 
For example, the Approval Date(s) and History table for ANDA No.  202958 (a generic version 
of Keppra XR, an antiepileptic) stores PDFs of the final approval letter and approved label for the 
generic. In the first line of the approval letter from the FDA to generic manufacturer Apotex, it 
references ANDA letter dated March 31, 2011, indicating the generic filing date. See Letter from 
William P. Rickman, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 25, 
2015), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2015/202958Orig1s000ltr.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/54ND-FS9F]. This—a brief mention in a PDF-only approval letter—appears to 
be the only way that filing dates have been made available to the public. We note that even that 
date may be slightly off. See, e.g., Letter from Sarah Cooleybeck & James M. Flaherty, Jr., 
Attorneys for Fresenius Medical Care North America, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin. 2 (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2012 
-P-0184-0001 [http://perma.cc/H6HC-D6K2] (date stamp one day later than the date of the 
letter). Other sources agree that this is the only location for filing dates. In late March of 2016, 
however, FDA commentators began to notice that the FDA had started to remove all filing dates 
from approval letters, eliminating the only source of approval dates. See, e.g., Bob Pollock, Do 
You Notice Something Missing? What the Heck!, LACHMAN CONSULTANTS (Mar. 31, 2016), 
http://www.lachmanconsultants.com/2016/03/do-you-notice-something-missing-what-the 
-heck [http://perma.cc/FB93-6T6B]. This also means that our study range cannot be extended 
past 2015. 
 92.   We also matched the generic applications to the reference drug using the FDA’s 
Orange Book data. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (describing the Orange Book). 
 93.   In rare exceptions, we discovered a citizen petition in our data set related to a generic 
application that was approved prior to 2006. We were able to use the same techniques described 
in this section to fill in filing dates for the relevant generic applications. Similarly, the FDA 
database of generic applications does not include approved 505(b)(2) applications. Thus, those 
applications were added as well, when necessary, for the 249 citizen petitions. 
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In assembling the data set of generic applications, we included a wealth of 
information, such as the active ingredients, dosage form, generic company, and the 
name, number, and company for the original reference drug. We then sorted all of 
the generic applications by application number. This was a crucial step because 
generic application numbers are generally assigned sequentially within the different 
numerical series that exist. For example, generic applications for drugs initially 
approved before 1962 were assigned numbers in the 80,000s in order of filing date. 
The 80,000s numbering scheme was replaced by sequential numbering starting in 
the 40,000s for generic applications referencing post-1962 FDA approvals. 
For generic applications referencing drugs approved in the Hatch-Waxman era 
beginning in the 1980s, numbers were originally assigned in the 70,000s. That 
numbering scheme was eventually replaced by a 90,000s numbering scheme in late 
2007.94 The advent of the 90,000s numbering scheme also retired the concurrent 
40,000 series, so all generic applications from that point on were sequentially 
numbered in the 90,000s.95 
When the FDA moved to a new IT platform in mid-2009, numbering changed 
once again. All drugs, including new drug applications and generic drug 
applications, were assigned six-digit numbers in the 200,000s. (Before this point, 
new drug applications were assigned five-digit numbers in the 20,000s, with even 
lower four- and five-digit numbers earlier in the FDA’s history.) In general, the 
numbering of applications has remained sequential in order of filing date, but the 
200,000 series is riddled with inconsistencies, in part because the FDA has allowed 
drug companies to reserve filing numbers before full submission of the necessary 
application materials. 
The FDA’s convoluted numbering history, despite its twists and turns, offers 
helpful clues about when a drug application was filed. A generic application filed in 
the 40,000s was filed after one numbered in the 80,000s; a generic application filed 
in the 70,000s came before generic applications in the 90,000s; a 200,000s generic 
application was filed later than any 90,000s generic applications; and so on. 
On a more detailed level, sequential numbering within a given numerical series 
allowed us to estimate filing dates for most generic applications to the specificity of 
quarter-years, by using the filing dates the FDA occasionally provides in approval 
letters.96 Quarter-years were chosen as the time unit for estimating filing dates 
 
 94.   Estimated switch time is based on our database. 
 95.   Kurt R. Karst, FDA Denies Petition Seeking to Add Application Information to Drug 
Labels, FDA LAW BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog 
_hyman_phelps/2012/01/fda-denies-petition-seeking-to-add-application-information-to-drug 
-labels.html [http://perma.cc/3AVW-3MFE]. To further complicate the numbering history, 
generic applications for antibiotics were previously assigned numbers in the 50,000s and 60,000s. 
These series were also retired when the 90,000s numbering scheme was introduced. 
 96.   By quarter-year we mean the following: January-March is the first quarter of a year, 
April-June is the second quarter, July-September is the third quarter, and October-December is 
the fourth quarter. For example, generic application No. 77715 was filed on May 19, 2005 (the 
second quarter of 2005), and generic application No. 77743 was filed on June 15, 2005 (also in the 
second quarter). With those two bookends available, we know that all generic applications in 
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because they represented the best trade-off between being able to estimate a fair 
majority of filing dates while also maintaining the level of granularity needed to 
examine citizen petition timing, where a few months can make a difference in delay. 
For example, the FDA must respond to citizen petitions filed after mid-2012 in 150 
days—precisely one and two-thirds quarters. First-filer exclusivity lasts 180 days—
precisely two quarters. When an estimate could not be made properly—for 
example, if the two available dates bookending an empty generic application were 
in two separate quarters—no quarter is entered. Again, this was an effort to err on 
the side of caution in assembling the information. 
This estimation process should be accurate in the vast majority of cases, but we 
do note that there may be occasional errors, particularly for generic applications 
numbered in the 200,000s. Fortunately, only four citizen petitions were matched to 
generic applications in the 200,000 series for which filing dates had to be estimated.  
Of the 4,222 generic applications approved between 2006 and 2015, 980 had 
exact filing dates available in approval letters, representing 23%. A further 2,108 
filing dates were estimated using the process described above, representing 50%. In 
all, the quarter in which a generic application was filed was found or estimated for 
3,088 generic applications, a success rate of 73%. 
b.   Matching Citizen Petitions to Relevant Applications 
Having constructed the data set of filing and approval dates for generic 
applications, we then sought to match the data set of 249 citizen petitions with the 
generic applications implicated by these petitions. In other words, what generic 
application would be most directly impacted, and potentially delayed, by the filing 
of the citizen petition? 
Occasionally, the “offending” generic application was explicitly named in the 
citizen petition.97 In most cases, however, the object of the citizen petition’s 
complaint was not so clear, perhaps because drug companies want to spread a wide 
net over all potential generic applications related to their existing drug. Similar to 
many citizen petitions, for example, Petition FDA-2009-P-0364 states, “Graceway 
respectfully requests that FDA refuse to approve any ANDA for a generic 
imiquimod cream product that seeks to rely on FDA’s prior approval of Aldara, 
unless the application contains data from [bioequivalence studies, among 
 
between, such as 77725, 77733, and 77741—all generic applications for which filing dates are not 
available—were almost certainly also filed in the second quarter of 2005. In our database, we 
marked these generic applications as having been filed in “2005-2,” with “2” representing the 
second quarter. We also included a flag to denote which filing dates were estimates and which 
were precise dates provided by the FDA. 
 97.   For example, Petition FDA-2012-P-0184 specifically asks that the FDA “refuse to 
accept Cypress ANDA No. 20-2820 for filing (or find ANDA No. 20-2820 not approvable if 
already accepted for filing).” See Letter from Sarah Cooleybeck & James M. Flaherty, Jr., supra 
note 91, at 2. 
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others].”98 
When a specific generic application was not identified, we turned to our 
generic application data set to find the first generic application filed that referenced 
the petitioner’s drug.99 The first-filer is significant for a number of reasons—it 
opens the floodgates to generic competition, bringing an initial drop in price and 
market share and more substantial reductions as other generics enter later on. Thus, 
the first generic application is the most lucrative milestone for a brand-name 
company to delay or block. 
Making this determination requires careful analysis, given that a drug’s 
characteristics outside of the active ingredients, such as dosage or route of 
administration, often mattered in making the first-filer determination. Consider, 
for example, Petition FDA-2011-P-0702, filed on September 23, 2011. This citizen 
petition asks the FDA not to approve any generic applications for Doryx 
(doxycycline hydrate). The petition specifically refers, however, to generic 
applications “for a 150 mg doxycycline hyclate delayed-release tablet product.”100 
Thus, the generic application relevant to the petition is most likely application No. 
91052, the first generic filing for a 150 mg delayed-release tablet form of the drug. 
Although we generally looked for the first-filed generic application as the 
appropriate reference point for a citizen petition, in a few instances, the first-filer 
could not have been the subject of the citizen petition. This occurred, for example, 
when a generic filed a petition seeking to prevent another generic from entering 
the market. A market with just two or three players is still a potentially lucrative 
one, so it is not surprising to see generics also engage in citizen petitioning to keep 
the number of generics down. In these cases, we attempted to identify the next-
filed generic application when possible. Similarly, when the first generic company 
to file an application was already on the market at the time of the citizen petition, 
meaning it could not be the subject of a petition trying to prevent approval or 
submission, we also chose a later application as most likely related. 
One should also note that citizen petitions can be submitted before the first 
generic application is filed, a type of preemptive strike against any generic 
submission. For example, Petition FDA-2009-P-0042 requests that the FDA 
approve no applications for a generic version of Argatroban.101 The petition was 
filed on January 30, 2009, but we determined that the first generic application 
 
 98.   Letter from James H. Lee, Chief Med. Officer, Graceway Pharm., LLC, to Comm’r of 
Food & Drugs, Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 2 (July 30, 2009), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-P-0364-0001 [http://perma.cc/7LU9-F8SG]. 
 99.   If multiple ANDAs were explicitly named in a petition, we identified the first-filed 
petition of those mentioned. 
 100.   Letter from Izumi Hara, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Warner Chilcott 
(U.S.), LLC, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Sept. 23, 2011), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2011-P-0702-0001 [http://perma.cc/NYA4-F2Z2]. 
 101.   Letter from Richard D. Kelly, Attorney for Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Corp. to 
Dockets Mgmt. Branch, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Jan. 30, 2009), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-P-0042-0001 [http://perma.cc/8AKU-9WV8]. 
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(No. 91665) was not filed until two quarters later.102 In those cases, the time from 
the filing of the generic application to the filing of the citizen petition was negative. 
Citizen petitions that could not be definitively linked to a generic application or for 
which appropriate timing data was not available were removed from our analysis.  
At the conclusion of this process, 164 delay-related citizen petitions of the 249 
originally identified were linked to a generic application that had data available—
either a filing date, an approval date, or both.103 This is a success rate of nearly two-
thirds, or 65.9%, among the citizen petitions identified as having the potential to 
delay generic entry. Of those 164 petitions, 152 (or 61% of the total 249 petitions) 
were linked to generic applications with both the filing date and approval date.104 
In sum, out of the 249 citizen petitions with the potential to delay generic entry, we 
were able to establish at least partial timelines for the generic applications with 
which they were most likely associated for nearly two-thirds, and full timelines for 
61%.  
c.   Establishing Key Metrics 
Using our final data set of 164 citizen petitions paired with relevant generic 
applications with timing information, we were able to create the following metrics: 
•   The number of quarters between when the relevant generic 
application was filed and when the citizen petition was filed 
(“Quarters Since Generic Filing”). 
•   The number of months between when the citizen petition was filed 
and the final approval of the relevant generic application (“Months 
Before Approval”). 
•   How long the generic application took to gain approval from start to 
finish (its “Total Approval Time” or “pendency”). 
•   At what point in the relevant generic application’s pendency the 
citizen petition was filed (the “Percentage Into Pendency”).105 
 
 102.   We note that it is possible, despite our efforts, that the generic application identified 
is not necessarily the first-filed generic application. If the actual first-filed generic application was 
never approved, it would not appear in the FDA’s public records. We do not think this occurrence 
is particularly likely, but we note that the lack of availability of unapproved generic applications 
may cause our data to miss applications that suffered the most from delay tactics, such as those 
that had to be withdrawn or those that were never approved because of issues with generic delay. 
 103.   In rare circumstances, a filing date was available but not an approval date. This 
occurred when a drug had only been tentatively approved but was still posted on the FDA’s 
website with an attached letter noting the filing date. 
 104.  There were a total of 157 delay-related citizen petitions with filing information 
(including those with only a filing date and those with both a filing and approval date) and 159 
delay-related citizen petitions with approval information (including those with only an approval 
date and those with both a filing and approval date). 
 105.   As an example, Petition FDA-2007-P-0418 was filed on November 9, 2007, the fourth 
quarter of 2007. We estimated that its relevant generic application, ANDA No. 78441, was filed 
in the third quarter of 2006. It was approved on May 14, 2009, the second quarter of 2009. 
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We used quarters as the standard measurement basis for “Quarters Since 
Generic Filing,” “Total Approval Time,” and “Percentage Into Pendency,” because 
those metrics required generic filing dates, many of which had to be estimated at 
the level of quarters. Meanwhile, we were able to use months rather than quarters 
for “Months Before Approval” because, unlike with generic filing information, 
exact dates to the specificity of month and day were available for both citizen 
petition filing and generic approval.  
Examining these core metrics will reveal trends of how citizen petitions 
interact with the generic approval process. 
V.   RESULTS 
A.   Overview 
As described in the opening section, the results of the study provide empirical 
evidence that the citizen petition process at the FDA has become a key avenue for 
strategic behavior by pharmaceutical companies to delay entry of generic 
competition. The following sections describe those results, but the most important 
findings are the following:  
•   The FDA’s citizen petition pathway is one of the key pathways 
involved in the modern generation of generic drug delay, playing a 
role in various game-playing strategies. 
•   Citizen petitions from competitor companies—brand names and 
generics seeking to delay competitors—have essentially doubled since 
2003. 
•   Citizen petitions with the potential to delay generic entry occupy a 
striking amount of the process in recent years. Out of all citizen 
petitions filed at the FDA between 2000 and 2012 (including those 
dealing with tobacco, food, dietary supplements, medical devices, 
etc.), nearly 15% had the potential to delay a generic drug application, 
climbing to 20% in some years. 
•   Many citizen petitions from competitor companies appear to be last-
ditch efforts to hold off generic competition. In fact, the most 
common grouping of petitions was those filed within six months of 
generic approval. This is particularly striking given that the 
overwhelming majority of citizen petitions are denied.106 In other 
 
Between the third quarter of 2006 (generic application filing) and the fourth quarter of 2007 
(citizen petition filing), five quarter-years had passed, so the value of “Quarters Since Generic 
Filing” for this citizen petition is “5.” Eighteen months and five days passed between November 9, 
2007 (citizen petition filing) and May 14, 2009 (generic approval), so “Months Before Approval” 
for this petition is “18.” Its “Total Approval Time,” from the third quarter of 2006 to the second 
quarter of 2009, is 11 quarter-years. The citizen petition came five quarters into the generic 
application’s 11-quarter pendency, so the “Percentage Into Pendency” is approximately 45.5%. 
 106.   See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 12 (finding that between 2011 and 2015, the FDA 
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words, the results suggest that many competitor petitions are filed late 
in the game, as a last-ditch effort to hold off competition just a little 
longer, even though they are unlikely to be successful. 
•   Congressional reforms enacted in 2007 have not stemmed the tide of 
such delay-related petitions.  
 
B.  Rise in Citizen Petitions with the Potential to Delay 
 A few observations emerge from Table I below. First, it is notable just how 
many citizen petitions seem to have the potential to delay generic entry, with 
proportions above 20% in 2010 and nearing 20% in other years. That means one in 
five of all citizen petitions—not just those concerning pharmaceuticals—were 
related in some way to pending generic applications or brand-name exclusivity in 
those years. 
Table I also adds more evidence for the hypothesis made earlier that petitions 
rose in popularity as a way to delay generics or raise issues about generics starting 
in 2003 and 2004. Not only did the number of citizen petitions rise noticeably after 
2002, but the number of delay-related petitions also has sharply increased as a 
proportion of all petitions. 
  
 
denied 92% of § 505(q) citizen petitions, the type most often employed to oppose generic entry); 
Carrier & Wander, supra note 10 (finding that the FDA denied 81% of all citizen petitions filed 
by competitors against drug companies between 2001 and 2010). 
72 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW Vol. 20:39 
TABLE I — ALL DELAY-RELATED PETITIONS, BY YEAR 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF DELAY-RELATED 
PETITIONS 
PERCENTAGE OF YEARLY TOTAL 
PETITIONS 
2000 2 2/47 = 4.3% 
2001 4 4/63 = 6.3% 
2002 5 5/106 = 4.7% 
2003 12 12/120 = 10.0% 
2004 26 26/178 = 14.6% 
2005 15 15/148 = 10.1% 
2006 24 24/184 = 13.0% 
2007 25 25/160 = 15.6% 
2008 23 23/166 = 13.9% 
2009 32 32/171 = 18.7% 
2010 31 31/149 = 20.8% 
2011 22 22/157 = 14.0% 
2012 28 28/141 = 19.9% 
TOTAL 249 249/1,790 = 13.9% 
C.   When Are Citizen Petitions Filed in Relation to Final Approval? 
We now turn to the results regarding the timing of when competitors file 
citizen petitions and the implications of that timing. The results described below 
suggest that many drug companies are filing citizen petitions as a last-ditch effort 
just months before generic approval. Moreover, many of these citizen petitions may 
be the last barrier standing in the way of final generic approval.  
We reached these conclusions in the following manner. For 152 of the 164 
citizen petitions in our data set, both a filing date and an approval date were 
available for the relevant generic applications, allowing us to calculate the average 
length of time a generic application takes from filing to approval. We will refer to 
this as the “total approval time.” On average, the total approval time for generic 
applications in our data set was 16.5 quarters, or approximately a little over four 
years. 
The histogram shown below in Figure I categorizes the generic applications 
based on the amount of time for which they were pending; the first bar, for 
example, corresponds to the nine generic applications that were pending for 1-4 
quarters.  
It is important to note that the generic applications that make up this 
calculation were those that had related citizen petitions. Thus, the information may 
not be generalizable to all generic applications. The limitation does, however, allow 
us to explore whether citizen petition reforms may have had an impact by reducing 
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the total application time for a generic. In particular, despite the 180-day (and later 
150-day) deadline on responding to citizen petitions, the average total application 
time for a generic was slightly longer for generics paired with petitions filed after 
the 2007 Amendments. In fact, the total application time for generic applications 
paired with delay-related citizen petitions was almost 10% longer after the 2007 
Amendments.107 
 
 
 
Next, we graphed the distribution of quarters that passed between filing of the 
relevant generic application and filing of the linked citizen petition, which is shown 
below in Figure II. We refer to this metric as “quarters since generic filing.” The 
histogram displays the number of citizen petitions that fell into each category; for 
instance, the bar labeled “0-2” indicates that the amount of time since generic filing 
was between zero quarters and two quarters for nineteen citizen petitions. This 
metric was available for 157 citizen petitions—the number of citizen petitions 
linked to generic applications with filing dates located or estimated. 
 A significant majority—over 75%—of the 157 citizen petitions were filed 
within 0-14 quarters after the relevant generic application was filed. Almost 90% 
were filed more than two quarters after the relevant generic application was filed, 
indicating that, in the large majority of cases, petitions are not fired off shortly after 
the announcement of a generic application.  
 
 107.   Generic applications paired with citizen petitions prior to the 2007 Amendments had 
an average total application time of 15.76 quarters compared with 16.95 quarters after the 2007 
Amendments. 
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The most interesting and profound result, however, arose when we graphed 
the amount of time between when a citizen petition was filed and when the linked 
generic application was approved. We call this metric “months before approval.” 
Our original hypothesis was that if citizen petitions are being used systematically to 
delay the approval of generics, citizen petitions might be deployed most effectively 
for that purpose near the end of a generic approval cycle. If filed earlier, a citizen 
petition would merely introduce a review process running parallel to the generic 
submission.  
Figure III below shows the results of this timing inquiry. First, we graphed the 
distribution of how many months passed between when the citizen petition was 
filed and when the generic received approval.108 
 
 
 108.   In Figures III, IV, and V, the “0-6” month and “6-12” month categories along the x-
axis are non-overlapping. The “0-6” category covers all citizen petitions filed up to six months 
before generic approval. The “6-12” category covers all citizen petitions filed six months and any 
number of days (i.e., six months and one day through six months and thirty/thirty-one days) 
before generic approval. The same applies for the rest of the categories along the x-axis. 
Winter 2017 DRUG PRICING GAMES 75 
 
 
There is a clear trend in favor of citizen petitions filed shortly before the FDA 
approves a generic. Almost half were filed within a year and a half of generic 
approval, with roughly 40% filed a year or less before generic approval.109 In fact, 
the most common category was “0-6 months,” with 33 petitions, or 21% of the 
total,110 filed with up to 6 months or less remaining before the FDA approved the 
generic. Considering that the average length of time from generic filing to approval 
is roughly four years, this category occurs most often during the final leg of the 
approval process.  
In other words, the trend is towards an increasing number of petitions as one 
moves closer to the final approval date. Thus, the histogram shown in Figure III 
above suggests that delay-related citizen petitions are often filed in the final stages 
of generic approval, raising concerns at the last minute, rather than early or midway 
through the process. This pattern potentially extends the length of the generic 
approval process, thus delaying the market entry of generic competition. 
 
 109.   To clarify, we noted above that we had 164 citizen petitions with at least partial time 
line information. Of these, we had generic approval dates for 158 and thus could measure the 
time between filing of the citizen petition and approval of the generic for those 158. Of the 158 
petitions, 78 petitions (49%) were filed within 18 months of generic drug approval and 60 
petitions (38%) were filed within 12 months of generic drug approval. 
 110.   The number of citizen petitions filed 6 months or less before generic drug approval 
was 33 out of a total of 158 petitions (21%). 
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Figure IV below looks specifically at the period before the 2007 Amendments. 
In this period, 41% of petitions were filed within a year and a half of generic 
approval.111 
 
 
 
In the period after the 2007 Amendments, the trend is even more dramatic, as 
shown in Figure V below. Of the 89 petitions filed in the post-2007 Amendments 
period, 56% were filed within a year and a half of generic approval.112 In fact, a 
remarkable 46% of petitions (41 petitions) were filed within a year of generic 
approval. The “0-6 months” and “6-12 months” categories were by far the most 
popular, garnering 24% and 22% of the total, respectively. 113 
 
 111.   A total of 69 citizen petitions were filed in the period before the 2007 Amendments. 
Twenty-eight of them were filed within 18 months of generic drug approval (41%). 
 112.   In the post-2007 Amendments period, we measured a total of 89 citizen petitions 
relating to generic drug applications with approval dates available. Of those 89 petitions, 50 were 
filed within 18 months of generic drug approval (56%). 
 113.   In the post-2007 Amendments period, the number of citizen petitions filed within six 
months of generic approval was 21 out of a total of 89 petitions (24%). The number of citizen 
petitions filed between 6 months and 12 months of generic approval was 20 out of a total of 89 
petitions (22%). Our findings are consistent with another study using a different methodology. 
In their examination of generic-related citizen petitions filed between 2011 and 2015, Carrier and 
Minniti found that 39% of drugs named in petitions were subject to a citizen petition within 6 
months of a brand-name drug’s “exclusionary date”—the date when a brand-name patent or FDA 
exclusivity would expire. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 12, at 338, 339 tbl.8. Ninety-eight percent 
of these “late-filed” petitions were denied. Id. at 351, 339 tbl.8. Our choice of sample in this study 
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The biggest exogenous shift between the 2000 to mid-2007 histogram (Figure 
IV) and the mid-2007 to 2012 histogram (Figure V) is, of course, the enactment of 
the 2007 Amendments. Its most notable change—requiring that the FDA respond 
to citizen petitions within 180 days—may explain why the post-2007 graph (Figure 
V) paints such a dramatic picture of citizen petition timing.  
Here is the observation: The FDA’s 180-day time limit for responding to citizen 
petitions equates to six months, which aligns exactly with our smallest category of 
0-6 months. From this perspective, one can see that for a remarkable percentage of 
citizen petitions filed after 2007, approval for the relevant generic is occurring right 
around the time when the FDA must respond to the citizen petition. Specifically, 
from the middle of 2007 to 2012, we see a plurality of citizen petitions filed within 
six months of final generic approval. 
This has two implications: first, many drug companies are filing citizen 
petitions as a last-ditch effort just months before generic approval; and, second, 
many of these citizen petitions may be the last barrier in the way of final generic 
approval.  
Put another way, when so many generic applications are approved within 6 
months—the equivalent of 180 days—of when a citizen petition is filed, and the 
FDA had 180 days to respond to the citizen petition, the relationship does not seem 
 
was slightly different—Carrier and Minniti focused only on petitions given a “505(q)” designation 
by the FDA. 
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to be mere coincidence. This may also explain why the trend toward late citizen 
petitions is not as pronounced in the period before the 2007 Amendments: citizen 
petitions may have still been filed during the late stages of the FDA’s consideration 
of generic applications, but since the FDA was not held to a specific deadline for 
responding to citizen petitions, lengthy petition reviews could have pushed back 
the horizon for final generic approval by more than six months. Delving deeper 
into this striking correlation between the FDA’s deadline of 180 days and the 
plurality of citizen petitions filed within 180 days of generic approval would be an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
 
D.   When Are Citizen Petitions Filed as a Percentage of the Total 
Application Time? 
We consider the results in the section above to be the most significant of the 
study, but we did discover an additional interesting finding—one that suggests 
pharmaceutical companies are not following the FDA’s mandate that a citizen 
petition must be filed as soon as the concerning information comes to light. As 
described above, the 2007 Amendments are intended to encourage people to file 
citizen petitions as soon as they discover a problem. Filers are required to certify 
that the petition was not intentionally delayed and provide the date when the filer 
became aware of the concern.114 The following results suggest that is not the case 
for most of the citizen petitions in our data set. 
In tracing timing issues in Figure II, we had focused on the time between when 
a generic application is filed and when the citizen petition is filed. Measuring the 
quarters between filing of the generic application and filing of a citizen petition 
does not necessarily provide a precise measure of how late in the process a citizen 
petition is filed, because even though the average approval time is around four 
years, different applications take different amounts of time to be approved. For 
example, just because the average approval takes sixteen quarters and a particular 
petition is filed eight quarters after the generic application was filed, this does not 
necessarily mean the petition came at the midpoint of the approval process. For 
example, if this particular generic’s total application time was only ten quarters, the 
petition would have actually come 80% of the way through the process. Similarly, 
even if a particular citizen petition was filed two quarters before approval, this 
would not necessarily be late in the process. If the process had only taken four 
quarters, two quarters would be the midpoint. 
However, it is possible to construct a more relative look at citizen petition 
timing. We calculated the “Percentage into Pendency,” which we defined as a 
standardized measure of when the citizen petition was filed as a percentage of the 
overall generic application approval length. 
On average, we find that citizen petitions are filed 56.8% of the way into the 
pendency of a generic application. In the set of 135 generic application-petition 
 
 114.   See supra text accompanying notes 61-69. 
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pairs used in this calculation,115 the average pendency was 17.8 quarters 
(approximately 4.5 years), and the average citizen petition was filed 9.1 quarter-
years into pendency (approximately 2.5 years). In other words, the average citizen 
petition came roughly halfway through the petition process. 
To illustrate, the histogram in Figure VI below shows the number of citizen 
petitions grouped into the ten deciles between 0% and 100% into pendency. For 
example, the first bar represents all citizen petitions that had a percentage into 
pendency ranging from 0% to 10%. The diagonal line in Figure VI illustrates the 
cumulative percentage of citizen petitions, out of the total 135 citizen petitions, that 
have fallen into the deciles up to that point.116  
 
 
 
As shown in Figure VI above, about 55% of petitions were filed more than 50% 
 
 115.   This calculation was only available if both filing dates and approval dates were 
available for a generic application, and it was not calculated if the citizen petition was filed before 
generic application filing, because then the Percentage Into Pendency would be negative, which 
skews averages and other descriptive statistics. A total of 135 generic application-petition pairs 
met these criteria, representing 82% of the petitions for which some data was available. 
 116.   For example, 8 citizen petitions were filed 0-10% of the way into pendency, and 
because 8 out of the total 135 petitions constitutes 6%, the line falls at 6% for the first decile. For 
the next decile, 7 petitions were filed 10-20% of the way into pendency. Added onto the 8 
petitions from the first decile, the result is 15 out of 135 petitions (11%) filed 0-20% of the way 
into pendency, so the line falls at 11% for the second decile. 
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of the way into pendency,117 and 37% were filed during the last 30% of pendency.118 
These findings do not differ significantly from a uniform distribution where each 
decile would contain 10% of citizen petitions, although perhaps more notable is that 
fewer than 30% of petitions were filed during the first 40% of pendency. 
The key issue, however, is the following. The 2007 Amendments formally 
require petitioners to declare that the filing was made as soon as the relevant 
information came to light. Given that the issues mentioned in citizen petitions are 
often apparent deficiencies in the relevant generic application itself, one might 
expect to see petitions early in the process if the system were working properly. 
Thus, we would not expect petition filings to be evenly distributed during 
pendency. Nor would we expect to see petitions grouped at the midpoint or later 
on, in the manner seen in Figure VI. 
It is also worth noting that the act of filing a citizen petition itself affects the 
pendency metric. Since a citizen petition can delay generic approval, the citizen 
petition may extend pendency beyond what would otherwise occur. The result 
would be the appearance that the citizen petition surfaced earlier in the approval 
process than it actually did. This effect may be particularly pronounced in the period 
before the 2007 Amendments, when citizen petitions were not subject to a response 
deadline and could drag on for long periods of time.  
To explore this hypothesis, we once again separated the data into slices before 
and after the 2007 Amendments. Our results are graphed below in Figures VII and 
VIII. Figure VII represents our data before the 2007 Amendments, and Figure VIII 
represents our data after the 2007 Amendments. No major trend appeared for 
citizen petitions filed before enactment of the Amendments. In this period, the 
average petition appeared 51.4% of the way into pendency. Only 47% of petitions 
were filed in the last half of generic application pendency, although the most 
popular category for filing was in the last tenth of pendency (shared with those filed 
between 40%-50% of the way through approval).119 
The findings for the period after the 2007 Amendments reveal a stronger trend 
toward later filing in recent years. This trend offers some validation for the 
hypothesis that extended review time for citizen petitions skews pendency data for 
petitions filed before passage of the 2007 Amendments. 
As illustrated in Figure VIII below, the average petition during the period after 
the 2007 Amendments was filed more than 60% of the way into pendency.120 More 
 
 117.   The number of citizen petitions filed 50-100% of the way into pendency was 74 out of 
a total of 135 petitions (55%). 
 118.   The number of citizen petitions filed 70-100% of the way into pendency was 50 out of 
a total of 135 petitions (37%). 
 119.   In the pre-2007 Amendments period, the number of citizen petitions filed 50-100% of 
the way into pendency was 26 out of a total of 55 petitions (47%). There were 9 citizen petitions 
filed 90-100% of the way into pendency, tied with 40-50% for the most petitions in any individual 
decile. 
 120.   In the post-2007 Amendments period, the number of citizen petitions filed 60-100% 
of the way into pendency was 44 out of a total of 80 petitions (55%). 
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than 42% of citizen petitions were filed during the final 30% of generic application 
approval, and the most common category was those petitions filed 80%-90% 
through the approval process.121 Notably, only 13.8% of petitions came during the 
first 30% of generic application pendency.122 It is unlikely to be coincidental that 
citizen petitions are filed so shortly before generic approval. Nor do the results 
suggest that competitors filing citizen petitions—many of which claim to have 
found deficiencies in the generic application—are filing them as soon as the 
information is uncovered. Finally, the results taken together suggest that the 2007 
Amendments have not succeeded in ending the practice of filing citizen petitions 
to delay generic entry. 
 
 
 
 
 121.   In the post-2007 Amendments period, the number of citizen petitions filed 70-100% 
of the way into pendency was 34 out of a total of 80 petitions (43%). There were 15 citizen 
petitions filed 80-90% of the way into pendency, the most of any individual decile. 
 122.   In the post-2007 Amendments period, the number of citizen petitions filed 0-30% of 
the way into pendency was 11 out of a total of 80 petitions (13.8%). 
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E.   Did the 2007 Amendments Do the Job? 
As described above, Congress amended the Food & Drug Administration Act 
in 2007 in an effort to prevent citizen petitions from being used to delay generic 
entry. The 2007 Amendments require the FDA to respond to citizen petitions 
concerning generic applications within 180 days (shortened to 150 days in 2012); 
require those filing such petitions to certify that the petition was not intentionally 
delayed and provide the date when the filer became aware of the concern; and give 
the FDA the power to summarily deny such petitions in certain circumstances.123 
Our study suggests that the 2007 Amendments have failed to stem the tide of citizen 
petitions intended to delay generic entry. 
Imposing a deadline of 180 days for the FDA to respond may have reduced the 
length of the delay, but has by no means deterred the behavior. As detailed above, 
many competitor petitions continue to be filed late in the game, as a last-ditch effort 
to hold off competition just a little longer, even though they are unlikely to be 
successful. The same is likely to be true for the 2012 Amendments, shortening the 
FDA’s deadline to 150 days. The time is slightly shorter, but the incentives remain 
the same.124 
 
 123.   See supra text accompanying notes 61-68. 
 124.   We cannot draw conclusions about the effects of the 2012 Amendments because our 
citizen petition data set only covers a time period up to 2012. We limited our search to citizen 
petitions filed prior to 2013 because test analyses indicated that citizen petitions filed after that 
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In particular, the FDA’s power to summarily dismiss frivolous petitions 
appears toothless in application. In its own annual reports, the FDA has mentioned 
several times that the requirement that the petition both intend to delay generics 
and raise no valid scientific or regulatory issue is a standard that is “extremely 
difficult to meet.”125 In fact, as of fiscal year 2014, the FDA had never denied a 
petition under this provision.126 
The 2007 Amendments require that the FDA submit an annual report detailing 
issues related to the § 505(q) program created by the Amendments.127 Although 
providing only aggregate numbers, the report suggests that the number of citizen 
petitions that fall within the § 505(q) program has increased since passage of the 
Amendments. Although the number has gone up and down along the way, in 2008, 
the FDA report shows 21 petitions filed, with that number rising to 28 in 2014. 
Similarly, the number of petitions handled overall by the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research has increased, from 78 in 2008 to 102 in 2014.128 One 
should note, as well, that the definition of 505(q) petitions does not include all 
petitions that have the potential to delay generic entry.129 
The FDA has further complained about “serial petitioning,” in which the FDA 
must respond to multiple petitions submitted sequentially about the same drug, a 
strategy that can delay approval for a considerable amount of time even though the 
FDA must respond to each petition within 150 days.130 For example, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) in early 2017 filed an antitrust action against Shire 
ViroPharma, alleging that the company abused regulatory processes by filing 43 
submissions at the FDA (including 24 meritless filings related to a single citizen 
petition docket) in an effort to hold off generic competition for its gastrointestinal 
drug, Vancocin.131 According to the complaint, the behavior resulted in hundreds 
 
time frequently related to drugs that had not yet been approved, as discussed in Section IV.B.1. 
 125.   U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS OF 
APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF AGENCY ACTION FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 10 (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA 
/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ReportsBudgets/UCM464282 
.pdf [hereinafter SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 126.   Id. 
 127.   21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). 
 128.   U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 7 n.7. The 
numbers of overall drug-related petitions, according to the FDA’s definition, does not include 
suitability petitions (defined in Part III) and over-the-counter monograph petitions. 
 129.   See infra text accompanying notes 135-137; see also Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, 
at 269. 
 130.   U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 10. 
 131.   Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Shire 
ViroPharma, Inc., No. 1:17CV00131 (D. Del Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files 
/documents/cases/viropharma_file-stamped_redacted_complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/D24Z 
-M5KH] [hereinafter FTC Complaint]; see also Letter from Michel de Rosen, Chief Exec. Officer, 
ViroPharma, Inc., to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Acting Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Div. of 
Dockets Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., (Mar. 17, 2006), https://www.regulations.gov 
/docket?D=FDA-2006-P-0007 [http://perma.cc/7S3P-AUFJ] (key citizen petition cited in the 
FTC’s complaint). 
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of millions of costs to patients and other purchasers.132  
In its annual report, the FDA must also show how many generic applications 
were delayed by citizen petitions.133 On its face, the picture looks quite rosy. Of the 
relevant citizen petitions that the FDA has resolved in seven years of reporting 
(2008-2014), only six petitions technically resulted in delay under the FDA’s 
definition.134 The problem, however, lies in the FDA’s definition of a generic 
application delayed by a citizen petition. First, a citizen petition filed before the 
relevant generic application is submitted or pending is not subject to 505(q).135 
Second, if a generic application is not ready for immediate approval at the 150-day 
response deadline, the Agency reports no delay.136 Thus, the Agency finds no delay 
even if responding to the petition diverted focus from approving the application, 
slowing the process. Additional important categories of petitions also are not 
included under 505(q), including petitions that relate to the six-month exclusivity 
for the first generic filer or petitions about one’s own application.137 Painted this 
way, the citizen petition picture does not look so rosy. 
In short, all of the trends we observed were stronger when examining the 
period after the 2007 Amendments in isolation. Part of this difference is likely due 
to the fact that the 180-day response deadlines enacted in the 2007 Amendments 
mean that some petitions are rejected more quickly. Thus, the period from citizen 
petition submission to generic approval is not stretched out as much by petitions as 
it often was before the 2007 reforms. However, considering we also found that 
generic application pendency has not decreased since the 2007 Amendments—and 
may have actually increased—it appears that the reforms have not led to a systematic 
decrease in the length of time to get a generic application to market. Avoiding delay, 
of course, was the goal of the 2007 Amendments. Finally, the number of delay-
related petitions has not decreased over time, according to both our own analysis 
and the FDA’s classification of § 505(q) petitions.138 
 
 132.   FTC Complaint, supra note 131, at 2. 
 133.   21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(3)(B) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). 
 134.   U.S. FOOD &  DRUG ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 8-9. 
 135.   Brendan Coffman, WSGR Alert: Citizen Petitions Aimed at Delaying Generic 
Competition Remain a Concern 1 (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.wsgr.com/publications 
/PDFSearch/wsgralert-citizen-petitions.pdf [http://perma.cc/43ZF-ALK9]. 
 136.   U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 9. 
 137.   505(q) GUIDANCE, supra note 82, at 4; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(4). 
 138.   In November of 2016, the FDA promulgated a new rule on citizen petitions, 
strengthening some of the language and requirements, as well as ever so slightly widening the 
number of petitions that must make certifications, by requiring certifications on petitions that 
“may” be subject to § 505(q). See Amendments to Regulations on Citizen Petitions, Petitions for 
Stay of Action, and Submission of Documents to Dockets, 81 Fed. Reg. 78500 (Nov. 8, 2016) 
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 10). However, while the petition filer will have to make certifications to 
this new category, the provisions of § 505(q), such as the 150-day response requirement, will not 
apply. As the FDA explains in the Federal Register discussion, “If there is no related ANDA, 
§ 505(b)(2) application, or 351(k) application pending at the time the petition is submitted, then 
the requirements of § 10.31 will apply to the petition, but we will not consider the provisions of 
§ 505(q) of the FD&C Act to apply to the petition.” See id. 
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These findings do not mean that § 505(q) has been totally ineffective. The 180-
day (and later 150-day) response deadlines for petitions certainly prevent any one 
citizen petition from extending the generic approval process for a significant 
amount of time, a huge improvement over the days when petitions could be 
pending for years.139 Nevertheless, while the possible magnitude of abuse may have 
been curbed, the amount of abuse that is taking place does not seem to have 
declined. Many petitions are still filed very late in the approval process, the number 
of petitions has not declined, and there is evidence that petitions are filed even later 
after the passage of the 2007 Amendments. If a petition still manages to hamper the 
FDA for a few months, that delay or slowing of the generic approval process can 
still be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in unfettered monopoly sales. 
While the 2007 Amendments may have reduced the length of the delay, they 
have failed to stop the tactic. As long as the benefits of 6 months of delay (180 days) 
can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, companies will be tempted to follow 
this path, and consumers will continue to pay the price. A different approach is 
needed. 
VI.   THE ROAD AHEAD 
As described in the prior section, the citizen petition process has been hijacked 
by pharmaceutical companies as a route to frustrate generic approvals. We find 
evidence that many citizen petitions are not filed as soon as potentially worrisome 
information about a drug is discovered, but are instead filed near the later stages of 
the generic approval process. Nearly half of delay-related citizen petitions between 
2000 and 2012 were filed within a year and half of generic approval. In fact, 46% of 
the petitions in the post-2007 Amendments period were filed within a year of final 
approval of the generic drug, and 24% were filed within 6 months. This suggests 
that these petitions were some of the last barriers standing in the way of approval 
for some generics. Our data shows that the average citizen petition in the period 
after the 2007 Amendments was filed more than 60% of the way through the 
generic application’s pendency, with more than 40% filed during the last 30% of 
pendency. 
Also troubling is that citizen petitions appear to be the main catalyst and 
foundation for attempting many other obstructionist delay strategies. As Feldman 
and Frondorf have documented, pharmaceutical companies are increasingly 
focusing their efforts to head off generic competition, using obstruction tactics 
involving administrative processes. Such tactics include skirmishes over drug labels 
and inserts, as well as using a safety program known as REMS (Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategies) to refuse to give generic companies samples of the branded 
 
 139.   See Carrier & Wander, supra note 10, at 285-86 (detailing a citizen petition process 
that delayed the introduction of a generic version of the insomnia drug Ambien for more than 3 
years at a cost of $3.1 billion). 
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drug necessary for demonstrating bioequivalence in the approval process.140 Many 
of these delay tactics operate through the citizen petition process, with 
pharmaceutical companies filing citizen petitions demanding that generic 
applicants use different labels or risk mitigation strategies, for example.141 Thus, 
citizen petitions are now a key pathway through which pharmaceutical companies 
attempt to make changes and raise concerns (often spurious ones) to obstruct or 
delay generic approval. At the moment, the FDA appears powerless to stop it, but 
what pathways would be more effective? 
Looking at the nature of the problem, one could imagine three types of 
approaches to curb the behavior of filing citizen petitions to delay generic entry.  
These might include 1) a simple prohibition on competitors filing citizen petitions 
related to generic entry, if one were to conclude that most behavior represented by 
this type of petition is likely to be inappropriate; 2) procedural blocks to ensure that 
the behavior cannot create suboptimal results; or 3) punitive measures as a 
deterrent. The section below describes each and sets out mechanisms for 
accomplishing the goals. The details of the mechanism are less important, however, 
than choosing among the pathways and identifying the proper incentive structures 
and the optimal institutional actors. 
A.   A Simple Prohibition 
The simplest approach for curbing abuse of the citizen petition process would 
be to prevent competitors from filing citizen petitions related to generic 
applications. This would be analogous to the per se rules in antitrust. If one 
concludes that the vast majority of behavior within a certain category is likely to be 
improper, societal resources may be better served by declaring the category per se 
off limits, rather than weighing each instance. 
Thus, in the antitrust context, the Supreme Court has noted that 
[t]he rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual 
market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct 
is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular 
case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.142 
Similarly, one author has described the limitations on patentable subject matter by 
explaining that, “with certain categories of patents, so few things within that space 
are likely to survive scrutiny that we cordon off the area for all.”143 
 
 140.   For a detailed discussion of these practices, see Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 
534; see also The CREATES ACT: Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and 
Ensuring Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights, 114th Cong. 58 (2016) (testimony of Robin 
Feldman discussing abuse of the REMS safety protocol process) (transcript on file with author) 
[hereinafter CREATES ACT Testimony]. 
 141.   See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 543-54. 
 142.   Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984). 
 143.   FELDMAN, supra note 21, at 99 (describing the limitations on patentable subject matter 
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This approach carries a certain cynicism regarding the likelihood that 
companies would have society’s best interests in mind when commenting on 
whether the FDA should trust their competitors to enter the market. It is a little 
like the fox offering to guard the henhouse.144 The incentives are not well-aligned 
with the desired outcome. Nevertheless, although banning competitors from filing 
citizen petitions is a simple approach, it is also simplistic. Pharmaceutical companies 
are likely to argue that, as the actors in the field most familiar with a drug, they are 
in the best position to sound the alarm when problems are on the horizon. Nor 
would this approach necessarily be fully effective. Companies could still submit 
generalized citizen petitions before any generic applications are filed or file 
petitions that have the effect of delaying entry—for example, by asking the FDA to 
reconsider all labeling related to the drug—without specifically requesting a delay. 
B.   Procedural Blocks 
An alternative approach would involve enacting procedural blocks to channel 
the behavior into positive, rather than suboptimal, results. In other words, one 
might wish to preserve the citizen petition process for all—including competitors—
and yet ensure that citizen petitions filed by competitors do not delay generic entry. 
For example, one might direct that citizen petitions filed by competitors must 
be filed within a year of when the generic company files for approval.145 Given that 
the average length of time for a generic application is approximately four years, 
citizen petitions filed within a year are less likely to delay final approval. 
Similarly, when competitors raise an issue related to the drug in general, the 
rule could be that the generic application goes forward on a timeline unrelated to 
the citizen petition. In other words, the generic can receive approval, and whatever 
issue is raised can be resolved after that approval, if necessary. After all, the branded 
drug remains on the market under the current requirements for the drug, which 
suggests that the issues raised in the citizen petition are not of such magnitude that 
the drug cannot be offered to the public. Thus, whatever issues must be resolved 
would be resolved as to all forms of the drug—generic and brand-name—on a 
timeline unrelated to the generic’s approval. One could refer to this as the “band 
plays on” rule. Even for issues related to whether the generic is bioequivalent or 
satisfies the FDA’s requirements, one could once again conclude that the Agency is 
generally the best judge of that—at least with issues so serious that approval must 
be denied. 
One concern is that, although most citizen petitions are denied, some are 
granted. This suggests that occasionally, legitimate issues are at stake, and safety 
 
in patent law). 
 144.   See CREATES ACT Testimony, supra note 140 (transcript of statement of Robin 
Feldman, using fox analogy in response to a senator’s question). 
 145.   This would require that the FDA make all generic applications public and easily 
searchable when they are filed. 
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must remain the FDA’s primary focus. Looking at concerns from the other 
direction, a “band plays on rule” still may squander some societal resources. The 
FDA must spend time responding to each concern raised. Similarly, branded 
companies could still use the tactic of filing citizen petitions to raise their rivals’ 
costs.146 In other words, generic competitors conceivably could be forced to spend 
time and money responding to spurious issues raised. Nevertheless, with the 
prospect of delayed entry off the table, such a procedural block could substantially 
decrease a brand-name company’s incentives to engage in this behavior. Of the 
choices discussed here, this may, indeed, be the most effective. 
C.   Punitive Deterrents 
The third approach would be to adopt some form of punitive measure designed 
to deter abuse of the citizen petition process, either through the courts or the FDA. 
Thus, parties that engage in behavior to try to block or delay generic entry through 
citizen petitions could be subject to a penalty calibrated to deter all but the hardiest 
of souls from engaging in the behavior in the first place. 
In contemplating this approach, the initial question would involve 
determining the proper adjudicatory body to task with deciding whether the 
behavior falls beyond bounds. In theory, one might suggest that the FDA is the 
proper adjudicatory body. After all, the FDA has the greatest expertise for 
evaluating whether the issues raised in a citizen petition are spurious or well-
founded. 
The FDA, however, has proven more effective at evaluating patient safety than 
party behavior. Since 2007, the Agency has had the power to summarily deny any 
petition filed with the primary purpose of delaying generic approval if the petition 
does not also raise valid scientific or regulatory issues.147 As noted above, the FDA 
had not used the provision even once through fiscal year 2014. It is certainly 
possible that a differently worded authority would prompt greater activity from the 
Agency. Nevertheless, one could argue that such a role may not be the right fit. The 
FDA may be better suited to evaluate science-related bad behavior than 
competition-related bad behavior. 
An alternative would be to provide greater power for competition authorities 
(such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ)) 
or third party actors (such as the competitors who suffer harm) to act against 
anticompetitive behavior involving citizen petitions. In general, however, antitrust 
actions are slow and expensive.148 Moreover, if the experience with pay-for-delay 
settlements is a guide, by the time the courts slowly begin choking off the behavior, 
 
 146.   See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (seminal work 
identifying ability of competitors to impose costs on rivals without similarly incurring such costs). 
 147.   See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2012). 
 148.   See generally Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 25, at 63, 72. 
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pharmaceutical companies will have altered their tactics.149 Antitrust law simply 
may not be sufficiently nimble. 
Most importantly, providing an effective antitrust pathway for challenging 
citizen petitions will require substantial shifts in doctrines related to antitrust and 
regulatory agencies. The Noerr-Pennington line of cases, dating back to the 1960s, 
establishes the general principle that one has the right to petition the government 
without fear of antitrust liability. Although antitrust liability may still attach if one’s 
petition to the government is judged to be a “sham,” the bar for establishing a sham 
petition is extremely high.150 
Certain types of citizen petition actions could be even more difficult to attack 
under antitrust law. For example, if citizen petitions are used to prevent a generic 
hopeful from obtaining samples of the branded product—which the generic needs 
in order to demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent—antitrust actors trying to 
challenge the behavior would also run up against Trinko.151 In the Trinko opinion, 
the Supreme Court all but shut the door on antitrust actions that claim a party’s 
competitor has improperly refused to sell to it. In general, competitors are not 
required to sell to each other, and as the Department of Justice has argued, refusals 
to deal or “forced sharing” rarely helps consumers in the long run.152 Although 
providing samples for generic approval may be the rare exception to the rule, 
getting past Trinko would be difficult. 
In short, Congress or the Supreme Court would have to be willing to alter 
antitrust doctrines in a manner sufficient to allow antitrust actors to bring 
successful litigation—without, of course, breaking the bank in the process. A 
punitive measure that costs exorbitant amounts to administer will have very little 
deterrent effect. 
D.   Transparency 
No approach is a perfect or permanent solution. Fixing abuse of the citizen 
petition pathway may require a combination of these approaches. Moreover, recent 
history has shown that when the legal system closes off one pathway, 
pharmaceutical companies search for others.153 Thus, whatever paths and 
 
 149.   See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3, at 516. 
 150.   See generally Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment & Patents: The Fraud 
Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 30 (2015) (discussing the history of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and its operation in practice). 
 151.   See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 152.   See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 119-29 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default 
/files/atr/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf [http://perma.cc/LQH7-Y4SF]; see also Geoffrey 
Manner, Senator Lee’s Prescription for Regulatory Failure in the Generic Drug Market, TRUTH 
ON THE MARKET (June 14, 2016), https://truthonthemarket.com/2016/06/14/senator-lees 
-prescription-for-regulatory-failure-in-the-generic-drug-market [http://perma.cc/6HXQ 
-VTCR] (describing Trinko as an impediment to antitrust cases regarding refusals to provide 
samples to generic applicants). 
 153.   See generally Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 3. 
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approaches are chosen to curb citizen petition abuse, it will be critical to ensure that 
regulators, legislators, and the courts can spot new techniques as they emerge. A 
little sunshine goes a long way.  
In particular, greater transparency from the FDA could be tremendously 
effective in exposing new drug pricing schemes early on. Although the FDA makes 
a wealth of information publicly available, there are significant gaps in the system. 
For example, as described in the methodology section, there is no systematic way 
to find the date on which a generic application was filed. One could argue that all 
generic applications should be posted when filed, along with the date of their filing, 
and that the public should not have to wait until the generic is approved to discover 
that information, if it even appears in the approval letter. As it stands now, the 
more effective a drug company is at blocking generic competition, the longer that 
company has before the public can see what is being done. 
At the very least, however, once a generic application has been approved, the 
public should be able to easily tell when the application was filed. Specifically, all 
approval letters should be posted on the FDA website, and the FDA website should 
always list filing and approval dates for every generic— online and not just in these 
letters. 
Unfortunately, the FDA appears to be moving in the opposite direction and 
lessening transparency. For our study, we were able to extract filing dates from 
some of the approval letters that the FDA posted and backfill many others through 
our estimation technique when the FDA approval letters did not mention the filing 
date. The FDA recently changed its protocols, however, so that the public will no 
longer be able to do even that. According to one report, the FDA has initiated a 
new protocol in which it will omit from approval letters any mention of the filing 
date of the original generic application.154 
Other basic information could improve transparency as well, including more 
complete labeling of citizen petitions themselves, and full information on generic 
application numbers and how they are assigned. Finally, the massive Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) backlog at the FDA also operates to mask improper 
behavior. When we inquired for our research, Agency personnel were wonderfully 
helpful but noted that FOIA requests are taking approximately two years for a 
response. 
Making full data on generic applications quickly and clearly available to the 
public is essential for curbing inappropriate behavior. Particularly if the FDA is not 
assigned the full task of policing competition, other actors—including state and 
federal regulators, legislators, academic researchers, public interest groups, and 
generics companies themselves—must have easy access to the relevant information. 
Transparency efforts such as these—along with the types of prohibitions, 
procedural blocks, or punitive measures approaches described above—are essential 
for curbing attempts to delay generic competition through citizen petitions. 
Without such endeavors, we will continue to see a citizen’s process diverted to the 
 
 154.   See Pollock, supra note 91. 
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service of pharmaceutical companies playing games to hold off generic entry as long 
as possible. Consumers, of course, pay the price. 
